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In late August 2014, the social media world was overtaken by the shock-
ing story of a fifteen-year-old online gamer, Paul Horner, who was reportedly
sentenced to twenty-five years to life in prison for his role in what has been
perceived as a mere online prank.1  According to the story, circulating on
popular media outlets including Facebook and Twitter, “ ‘[w]hat many teen-
agers . . . are considering a harmless prank . . . landed one online gamer in
more trouble than he could have ever imagined.’”2  The article continued by
identifying that supposed “harmless prank” as an act known as “swatting” and
reported that Horner’s role in the swatting constituted domestic terrorism,
resulting in a sentence of twenty-five years to life.3  While the story ultimately
proved to be a hoax, it nonetheless shed light on swatting as a dangerous
intimidation tactic that is growing increasingly common across American
communities and prompted a number of prosecutions and convictions
nationwide.4
* J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2016; B.S. in Science-Business and B.S. in
Political Science, University of Notre Dame, 2013.  This Note is dedicated to my parents,
and my siblings Tara, Tommy, and Luke for all of their support and encouragement over
the years.  I would also like to thank Professor Jimmy Gurulé for his guidance in
developing this Note as well as the Notre Dame Law Review staff for their help in the editing
process.
1 Simi John, 15-Year-Old Gamer Convicted in ‘Swatting’ Hoax: Satirical Article Creates Stir




4 See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Individual Pleads Guilty in Swatting Conspir-
acy Case (Jan. 29, 2009) [hereinafter DOJ Weigman Conviction], available at http://www
.justice.gov/usao/txn/PressRel09/weigman_swat_ple_pr.html (discussing sentencing of
Matthew Weigman for his involvement in a swatting conspiracy); Press Release, Dep’t of
Justice, Last Defendant Sentenced in Swatting Conspiracy (Nov. 16, 2009) [hereinafter
DOJ Nalley Conviction], available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/txn/PressRel09/nal-
2001
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The act of swatting involves individuals making fraudulent 911 calls and
reporting threats or ongoing violent situations in order to draw a response
from law enforcement, usually a SWAT team.5  Through the use of deceptive
means such as Caller ID spoofing technology, individuals placing the call
make it appear as though the threats or emergency reports are coming from
the victim’s phone.6  The authorities respond with weapons drawn, expecting
a high-risk incident, thereby creating a dangerous situation for the unsus-
pecting swatting victim and police alike.7  From the time swatting was first
brought to the attention of the FBI in 2008,8 the phone hacking phenome-
non has grown increasingly popular, particularly in the realm of online gam-
ing and in use against Hollywood celebrities.9  In these areas, swatting
functions primarily as a prank, albeit a very dangerous prank.  Swatting
presents a high degree of danger not only for the victims staring down the
barrel of SWAT team guns,10 but also presents peripheral danger to the com-
munity and the law enforcement officers themselves as they rapidly respond
ley_swat_sen_pr.html (discussing sentencing of Carlton Nalley for his involvement in a
swatting conspiracy).
5 The Crime of ‘Swatting’: Fake 9-1-1 Calls Have Real Consequences, FBI (Sept. 3, 2013),
http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2013/september/the-crime-of-swatting-fake-9-1-1-calls-
have-real-consequences/the-crime-of-swatting-fake-9-1-1-calls-have-real-consequences.
6 Id.; see also Eric Brumfield, Chapter 284: Deterring and Paying for Prank 911 Calls that
Generate a SWAT Team Response, 45 MCGEORGE L. REV. 571, 572 (2014) (referencing the
process of swatting and its use of “caller ID spoofing technology”); Adam Panagia, Direc-
tor, AT&T Network Fraud Investigations, Panel Discussion at Robocalls All the Rage: An
FTC Summit (Oct. 18, 2012) (discussing the goals of swatting and the use of telecommuni-
cations technology in carrying out a swatting attack).
7 See Don’t Make the Call: The New Phenomenon of ‘Swatting’, FBI (Feb. 4, 2008), http://
www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/february/swatting020408 (“Needless to say, these calls are
dangerous to first responders and to the victims.”); see also Adam Nagourney & Ian Lovett,
‘Swatting’ Hoax Tests the Police and Stars Alike, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2013), http://www
.nytimes.com/2013/04/11/us/hollywood-swatting-hoax-strains-both-police-and-stars
.html?pagewanted=all (discussing the danger presented to both victims and first respond-
ers swatting incidents); The Crime of ‘Swatting’, supra note 5 (stating that the FBI takes swat-
ting crimes very seriously because “[i]t’s only a matter of time before somebody gets
seriously injured” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
8 The Crime of ‘Swatting’, supra note 5.
9 See Brumfield, supra note 6, at 571 (“‘[T]here have been more than 400 ‘swatting’
calls’ [sic] nationwide . . . mainly associated with celebrity homes.”); Nagourney & Lovett,
supra note 7 (listing a number of celebrities who have been recent swatting victims and
expressing the explosion in popularity of swatting attacks in Hollywood); see also Angela
Ellis & Joanne Fuchs, Hackers Prank Call Authorities, Provoke SWAT Team Response, ABC NEWS
(Aug. 16, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/US/swatting-hackers-prank-calls-authorities-pro-
voke-swat-team/story?id=14312879 (describing a swatting incident involving a teenaged
gamer and discussing the growth of swatting incidents amongst gamers in the United
States and Canada).
10 See, e.g., Ellis & Fuchs, supra note 9 (describing a SWAT team response to a swatting
call and expressing the victim’s fear and endangerment as the SWAT team “[had] their
guns pointed at [him]” (internal quotation marks omitted)); John Keilman, ‘Swatting’ No
Prank to Video Game Celebrities, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 12, 2014, 5:15 PM), http://www.chicago-
tribune.com/suburbs/bolingbrook-plainfield/ct-swatting-video-games-met-20140912-story
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to the false reports.11  Additionally, the mass response by authorities to false
reports is further damaging as it is highly expensive and threatens the effec-
tiveness of our law enforcement agencies.12  Clearly all instances of swatting
present a real threat to safety in American communities, however, as the
practice has grown increasingly prevalent, there have been instances of its
use for far more alarming and disconcerting purposes meriting a closer
examination of the legal recourse necessary to combat swatting.
As stated previously, swatting is most prevalent in the online gaming
community where individuals regularly interact anonymously and personal
information is easily accessible to Internet hackers seeking to intimidate fel-
low gamers.  However, as early as July 2011, several conservative political com-
mentators were victims of swatting incidents resulting in responses from
authorities at their homes.13  The use of swatting as a form of political intimi-
dation against the ideals of another by placing them in potentially dangerous
situations is of grave concern and must be addressed.  Such politically moti-
vated swatting activities bring to the fore a sinister application of this phe-
nomenon, in which it is aimed at silencing particular viewpoints in political
discourse.  Such actions threaten not only the safety of the parties involved,
but at a deeper level pose a threat to the viability and integrity of the Ameri-
can political system, which is heavily reliant upon free expression.  While cer-
tainly the classification of a teenaged gamer, such as Paul Horner mentioned
at the outset, as a domestic terrorist for his actions in a swatting scandal is a
fiction, recognition of this political threat raises the question of whether or
not swatting in the political context is deserving of treatment as domestic
terrorism and the heightened sentencing that comes with that designation.
This Note will attempt to address the question of whether or not inci-
dents of swatting aimed at contrary political ideals meet the characterization
of domestic terrorism in the post–9/11 era.  In particular, there will be con-
sideration of the extent to which treatment of political swatting as domestic
terrorism is consistent with the maintenance of the delicate balance between
public safety concerns and protection of the constitutional values of free
.html#page=1 (“[T]he threat [to civilians] is real, straining the nerves of gamers and law
enforcement professionals alike.”).
11 See, e.g., The Crime of ‘Swatting’, supra note 5 (referencing an incident in which a
police officer was injured in a car accident as a result of his rushing to the scene of a
reported emergency that turned out to be a swatting incident).
12 Id.; see also Nagourney & Lovett, supra note 7.
13 Christopher Collins, Erik Erickson of RedState Targeted in Latest ‘SWATting’ Attack,
EXAMINER.COM (May 28, 2012, 8:10 AM), http://www.examiner.com/article/erick-erick-
son-of-redstate-targeted-latest-swatting-attack; CNN Contributor Erickson and Family Targeted
in Latest ‘Swating’ Attack, BREITBART (May 27, 2012), http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Govern-
ment/2012/05/27/cnn-contributor-targeted-in-swating-attack; Arlette Saenz, Senator Asks
DOJ to Investigate SWAT-ting Attacks on Conservative Bloggers, ABC NEWS (June 6, 2012, 6:37
PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/06/senator-asks-doj-to-investigate-swat-
ting-attacks-on-conservative-bloggers/; John Sexton, LA Weekly Interviews Patterico about His
Swatting, BREITBART (Nov. 9, 2012), http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2012/11/
09/LA-Weekly-Interviews-Patterico-About-His-SWATting.
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speech and free expression.  This Note will proceed in four parts.  Part I will
examine the growth of telecommunication manipulation practices from
products of curiosity to an alarming means of intimidation in modern day
swatting and the dangers swatting presents to American communities.  Part II
will offer a history of the development of domestic terrorism in American
jurisprudence and discuss the current state of domestic terrorism in the
post–9/11 era.  Part III provides context for the application of the domestic
terrorism classification by offering examples of domestic terrorism in U.S.
history, particularly the rise of “special-interest” domestic terrorism.  Finally,
Part IV analyzes political swatting in light of domestic terrorism requirements
grown out of the PATRIOT Act14 and in comparison with prior examples of
crimes classed as domestic terrorism.  Part IV concludes with the argument
that, in light of the definitional requirements of domestic terrorism in the
United States and strong public policy interests, swatting should in fact be
classified as an act of domestic terrorism when used to intimidate political
adversaries or coerce advocates of a particular viewpoint to withdraw from
participation in political discourse.
I. SWATTING: A DANGEROUS TAKE ON AN OLD CRIME
A. Predecessor to Swatting
While swatting is a relatively young phenomenon, crimes involving the
manipulation of technology integrated in telecommunication channels dates
back several decades.  An early predecessor to modern day telephone and
computer hacking was a practice that came to be known as phone “phreak-
ing.”  Phreaking was a term used to describe practices in which individuals
would “study, experiment with, [and] explore telecommunication systems,
such as equipment and systems connected to public telephone networks.”15
In the 1950s and 1960s, phone phreaking arose out of curiosity on the part of
intelligent youth including, but not limited to, students from some of the
nation’s top universities.16  In those early days, the exploration and manipu-
lation of telecommunication channels was not prompted by money, but
rather a mere fascination with the virtual world in which phreakers could
interact and explore the bounds of new communication technology.17
Phreaking reached its peak in the early 1970s when John Draper discovered
14 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
15 Brent Dean, Phreaking and Spoofing—A Short History, COMPUTER CRIME & TECH. L.
ENFORCEMENT (Quinlan), July 2011, art. 4; see also Don’t Make the Call, supra note 7 (describ-
ing “phone phreakers” and their practices “hacking into phone companies’ computers and
making free long-distance calls”).
16 Chris Baraniuk, Whatever Happened to the Phone Phreaks?, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 20,
2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/02/whatever-happened-to-
the-phone-phreaks/273332/.
17 Id. (“These were not people who were out to make free phone calls, you know, for
the sake of making free phone calls.  They were just like, ‘Wow, what happens if.  What
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that the emission of precise tones, at precise times, enabled users to make
free calls through pay phones.18  On the heels of Draper’s discovery, phreak-
ing exploded in popularity and the practice began to take on economic sig-
nificance as parties used those exploitation tactics for a variety of purposes
ranging from Caller ID manipulation to free teleconferencing.19  As technol-
ogy changed and telephone networks became increasingly computerized, the
underlying concepts established by early phreakers heavily influenced the
development of more complex and sophisticated manipulation practices
such as computer hacking.20  Today the legacy of phreaking lives on as
manipulation and exploitation of telecommunication technology continues.
However, what was initially motivated by curiosity and fascination now often
serves as a vehicle for economic gains,21 and has seen application in far more
sinister spin offs such as swatting.
B. The Mechanics of Swatting and SWAT Deployment
Having developed along with modern technology and drawing upon the
methodology and discoveries generated by phreakers, a modern day “more
serious twist on [that] old crime” has manifested itself in the practice of swat-
ting.22  Advances in modern technology have made masking the origin of
calls easier than ever, which in turn has substantially contributed to the
increased pervasiveness of swatting instances as the body of individuals capa-
ble of carrying out the acts has broadened.23  Swatting refers to the practice
of making a hoax call to 911 prompting the deployment of a SWAT team
happens if I dial this number?  What happens if I play this tone?  They were simply
curious.”).
18 Dean, supra note 15 (describing Draper’s discovery that a whistle as a prize in a
“Cap’n Crunch” box emitted the precise tone that would allow free calls to be made
through pay phones); see Peter T. Leeson & Christopher J. Coyne, The Economics of Com-
puter Hacking, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 511, 513 (2005).
19 See Dean, supra note 15 (discussing businesses’ use of phreaking methods for pur-
poses of enabling call centers “to display one main telephone number on all outgoing
calls, even though those calls were not really originating from those numbers”); see also
Leeson & Coyne, supra note 18, at 513 (explaining Draper’s discovery created an opportu-
nity for exploitation of AT&T’s switching system to make free long distance calls);
Baraniuk, supra note 16 (“[H]ackers would phreak their way into teleconferencing systems
in order to have all-night group discussions—always at the expense of someone else (a
client of the teleconferencing company).”).
20 Dean, supra note 15 (discussing the computerization of telephone networks and the
link between early phreaking methods and computer hacking); see also Leeson & Coyne,
supra note 18, at 513–15 (tracing the earliest origins of computer hacking to phreaking
practices).
21 Leeson & Coyne, supra note 18, at 524–25 (“A third class of hackers is driven by the
profit potential of hacking activity.”).
22 Don’t Make the Call, supra note 7.
23 Dean, supra note 15 (discussing new smart phone apps and internet services that
mask the origins of calls, thereby making anonymous phone calling readily available to the
public at large).
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response.24  To prompt the response of a SWAT unit, swatters describe a
highly dangerous situation unfolding, often involving claims of weapons, vio-
lence, and a continuing threat to the safety of the community.25  Through
the use of Caller ID spoofing,26 swatters are able to make the fraudulent
phone call appear as though it is coming from the residence or business of
their intended victim, thereby directing the SWAT response to that
location.27
To appreciate the gravity of the danger resultant from such acts of swat-
ting requires an understanding of SWAT teams and the functions they serve.
SWAT units first came into existence in the late 1960s with the recognition
that the ordinary police officer was not adequately trained or equipped to
handle “incidents in which the slightest slip could cost many lives.”28  There-
fore, SWAT teams exist to provide a police force capable of adequately meet-
ing the unique challenges of high-risk situations.29  Today, the majority of
police departments have either their own SWAT team or access to units capa-
ble to providing such high-stakes response services.30  These teams are spe-
cially trained and equipped to face the most severe threats encountered by
law enforcement and their deployment often entails the expectation of heavy
violence, making such instances highly dangerous and tense.31
C. Modern Day Instances of Swatting and the Dangers Presented
The phone-hacking phenomenon known as swatting was first brought to
the attention to the FBI in 200832 and has since experienced considerable
growth across the country, even rising to the level of “near-epidemic propor-
tions” in some areas.33  The practice of swatting has most prominently taken
root in online gaming communities where anonymous interaction is com-
24 The Crime of ‘Swatting’, supra note 5.
25 Don’t Make the Call, supra note 7 (describing the reports relayed by swatters to
prompt mass response by authorities, such as “tales of hostages about to be executed or
bombs about to go off”).
26 Panagia, supra note 6 (explaining Caller ID spoofing as “[t]he practice of sending
false or misleading information, so as to deceive the receiving party and/or hide the
caller’s true identity and/or call origination”); see also Dean, supra note 15 (“Caller ID
‘spoofing’ . . . is essentially the practice of disguising or obscuring the origin of a transmis-
sion, in [a “swatting”] case, the source of a telephone call.”).
27 The Crime of ‘Swatting’, supra note 5.
28 Karan R. Singh, Treading the Thin Blue Line: Military Special-Operations Trained Police
SWAT Teams and the Constitution, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 673, 677–78 (2001).
29 Id. at 677.
30 Id. at 680.
31 See id. at 680–84.
32 The Crime of ‘Swatting’, supra note 5.
33 Brumfield, supra note 6, at 575 (quoting California State Senator Lieu who stated
that swatting “has grown to near-epidemic proportions in California—particularly through-
out Los Angeles County” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also id. at 571 (recogniz-
ing that “there have been more than 400 ‘swatting’ calls nationwide; these calls have been
mainly associated with celebrity homes”).
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mon and personal information is easily accessible to savvy hackers operating
in those forums.34  However, recent trends have moved towards an increased
targeting of celebrities as victims of swatting incidents, with victims ranging
from comedian Russell Brand to popular artists such as Rihanna and Justin
Timberlake.35  For authorities, the swatting phenomenon is alarming as it
jeopardizes the safety of the victims, the responders, and the community at
large.36  Plainly stated, the risk of injury or death is beyond question in these
instances.  Kevin Kolbye, the assistant special-agent-in-charge of the FBI’s Dal-
las Division underscored the severity of the risk associated with a SWAT team
raid stating, “[t]hey are in a heightened state, the safety’s off and their finger
is close to the trigger.”37  Whether it is an officer injured in responding to
the scene or in confronting an unsuspecting victim, a civilian harmed as
authorities speed through neighborhoods, or a victim injured in a violent
SWAT team entry, Kolbye says “[i]ts only a matter of time before somebody
gets seriously injured as a result of one of these [swatting] incidents.”38
In addition to the risk of injury, swatting responses by authorities pose
other risks worth considering.  First, there is a heavy financial burden associ-
ated with the deployment of a SWAT team.  Mass police responses can cost
thousands of dollars, with expenses reaching as much as $10,000 for a full-
blown SWAT team deployment.39  Further, swatting imposes a less tangible,
but equally concerning cost, in that it interferes with the effectiveness of law
enforcement authorities.40  A cause for concern in the law enforcement com-
munity is that resources applied to a false swatting report may deprive an
adequate response to a simultaneous criminal incident requiring immediate
police action.41  Equally devastating would be a situation where suspicion of a
34 See Ellis & Fuchs, supra note 9 (describing an incident involving a fifteen-year-old
gamer who was targeted by swatters, leading to a SWAT team storming his Florida home);
Keilman, supra note 10 (stating that “swatting” is “increasingly striking participants in the
world of video gaming”).
35 Brumfield, supra note 6, at 571 (“What do Russell Brand, Justin Timberlake,
Rihanna, and Selena Gomez have in common? . . . They have all been victims of ‘swat-
ting.’”); see also Nagourney & Lovett, supra note 7 (highlighting the rising problem that
“swatting” presents in Hollywood, and mentioning specific cases of “swatting” involving
Justin Bieber, Tom Cruise, and Miley Cyrus).
36 The Crime of ‘Swatting’, supra note 5 (highlighting general threats to victims,
responders, and society as a result of swatting).
37 Ellis & Fuchs, supra note 9 (quoting Kevin Kolbye, the assistant special agent in
charge of the FBI’s Dallas office) (internal quotation marks omitted).
38 The Crime of ‘Swatting’, supra note 5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
39 Id.; see also Nagourney & Lovett, supra note 7 (“[R]esponses can cost thousands of
dollars and . . . a full-blown SWAT team can cost $10,000.”).
40 Nagourney & Lovett, supra note 7 (explaining the difficulties created by fraudulent
emergency reports including a difficulty in determining which calls are valid and deserving
of a full-blown response).
41 See, e.g., id.
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reported threat being a swatting event results in an insufficient response to a
real, life-threatening criminal incident.42
The seriousness of these fears and concerns is manifested in the recent
convictions of high-profile swatters to substantial prison sentences43 and in
the efforts in some states to enact legislation to specifically combat the
mounting swatting threat.44  In November 2009, Carlton Nalley was sen-
tenced by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas to 108
months in federal prison following a guilty plea for offenses relating to his
involvement in a swatting conspiracy.45  Nalley’s offenses included “one
count of conspiracy to retaliate against a witness, victim, or informant and
one count of conspiracy to commit access device fraud and unauthorized
access of a protected computer.”46  That conviction came on the heels of the
earlier sentencing of Matthew Weigman, in June 2009, in the Northern Dis-
trict of Texas to 135 months in federal prison following his conviction on the
same charges as Nalley.47  Clearly, the past convictions of swatters are indica-
tive of the recognition by law enforcement officials that swatting poses a real
public safety concern and merits substantial deterrence through stiff
punishment.
D. Swatting as a Weapon in Political Debate
While previous paragraphs illustrate that swatting is a serious offense
and one not taken lightly by law enforcement, the recent use of swatting as a
means of intimidation in the realm of political discourse is a cause for consid-
eration as to whether increased punishment, in excess of the sentencing stan-
dards provided under criminal law provisions, may be justified to vigorously
eliminate the practice from use as a weapon to silence political opposition.
Classification of political swatting as an act of domestic terrorism would per-
mit the application of harsher sentencing guidelines and in so doing would
offer stronger deterrence of future acts of swatting.48  In July 2011, Patrick
42 Id. (“If officers are thinking it could be a swatting, maybe they let their guard down
approaching the home.  What happens if one of these days, it’s a real incident?  The safety
of everyone could be jeopardized because of this boy crying wolf.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
43 See, e.g., DOJ Nalley Conviction, supra note 4; see also DOJ Weigman Conviction,
supra note 4.
44 Brumfield, supra note 6, at 574–80 (analyzing how chapter 284 changes punishment
for a “swatting” call and how such punishment changes deter the mounting issue); see also
Nagourney & Lovett, supra note 7 (discussing recent state senate committee meetings in
California advocating legislation to make it easier to convict individuals filing false
reports).
45 DOJ Nalley Conviction, supra note 4.
46 Id.
47 DOJ Weigman Conviction, supra note 4.
48 See Jonathan Masters, Militant Extremists in the United States, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS (Feb. 7, 2011), http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations-and-networks/mili-
tant-extremists-united-states/p9236 (asserting the fact that a domestic terrorism determina-
tion “invokes much harsher sentencing guidelines”).
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Frey, a deputy district attorney in Los Angeles and conservative blogger writ-
ing under the name “Patterico,” was a victim of a swatting after police
received a 911 call from Frey’s home in which a man claimed to have killed
his wife.49  Frey, who was initially handcuffed and his home searched,
expressed his fear saying, “[i]t’s a phone call that could have gotten me
killed.”50  A similar incident happened to CNN contributor, and editor-in-
chief of RedState.com, Erik Erickson in May 2012 when sheriff’s deputies
arrived at Erickson’s Georgia home following receipt of a call from his phone
number claiming that an accidental shooting had occurred at the family din-
ner table.51
Both incidents raise serious concerns over the use of swatting as a vehicle
for political intimidation and the potential employment of swatting as a
means of silencing expression of political opposition.  Senator Saxby Cham-
bliss of Georgia voiced his concerns in a letter to Attorney General Eric
Holder, seeking an investigation into the swatting incidents targeting “mem-
bers of the community of online political commentators.”52  Recognizing the
alarming use of swatting to target political speech, Chambliss expressed his
concerns stating:
The perpetrators appear to be targeting individuals who are vigorously exer-
cising their First Amendment rights to political speech [and] . . . efforts to
intimidate those who choose to enter the political forum and express their
opinions are in conflict with the founding principles of our nation.
Regardless of any potential political differences that may exist, threats
and intimidation have no place in our national political discourse.53
It is clear that the legacy of phreaking, which grew out of harmless curi-
osity to explore a new technology, has progressed into a frightening and dan-
gerous means of political attack in swatting.  While “inquisitiveness is a
fundamental and valuable part of humanity—especially for a humanity which
day by day absorbs more and more complex machinery,”54 the use of the
discoveries of such inquisitiveness to both intimidate political adversaries and
silence a contrary viewpoint raises a real legal concern requiring not only
attention, but also adequate recourse.  Such recourse may be found in the
heightened sentencing that would come with classifying political swatting as
domestic terrorism under the 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) definition.
49 Saenz, supra note 13.
50 Id.; see also Sexton, supra note 13 (recounting Frey’s fears of having law enforce-
ment shoot him if they mistook his cell phone for a gun).
51 Collins, supra note 13; Saenz, supra note 13.
52 Letter from Saxby Chambliss, U.S. Senator, to Eric Holder, Attorney Gen., Dep’t of
Justice (June 5, 2012) [hereinafter Chambliss Letter], available at https://votesmart.org/
public-statement/704214/letter-to-attorney-general-eric-holder#.VOfkSy6FiFs.
53 Id.
54 Baraniuk, supra note 16.
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II. RISE OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM
A. Terrorism Generally
In the post–9/11 era, the term terrorism is all too common in the Amer-
ican vocabulary, and while there is general consensus that “terrorism” carries
a pejorative connotation,55 there remains no precise or widely accepted defi-
nition that entirely encapsulates the concept of terrorism.56  Inconsistency in
the definition exists from the international level57 all the way down to differ-
ences in how terrorism is characterized between state and local entities.58
The lack of a concrete definition for terrorism has prompted some criticism
from those claiming that “terrorism” is little more than a “fad” word applied
indiscriminately across a broad range of violent or threatening acts.59
However, regardless of any inability to comprehensively define terror-
ism, there are several consistent themes that serve as fundamental, concep-
tual aspects of terrorism.60  The most elemental characteristic distinguishing
acts of terrorism from plainly criminal acts is the fact that terrorist acts are
rooted in the furtherance of special interests, namely political or social objec-
tives.61  This is an important distinction as it removes from the terrorism clas-
sification those illicit actions taken solely for economic gain.  “[T]he purpose
of [a] criminal act does not go beyond the act itself or the acquisition of
money and other valuables”; conversely, however, a terrorist act is “in pursuit
55 KEVIN JACK RILEY & BRUCE HOFFMAN, DOMESTIC TERRORISM: A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT
OF STATE AND LOCAL PREPAREDNESS 2 (1995).
56 Id.; see also Dane E. Johnson, Cages, Clinics, and Consequences: The Chilling Problems of
Controlling Special-Interest Extremism, 86 OR. L. REV. 249, 256 (2007) (“The concept of terror-
ism has persisted throughout history, but resists capture in a universal definition despite
the efforts of sociologists, theologists, philosophers, psychologists, and law-makers.” (foot-
note omitted)).
57 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (indicating
that nations are “divisively split” in their definitions of terrorism); Johnson, supra note 56,
at 256 (“Here and abroad, debate over the elements of terrorism continues.”); Frederick V.
Perry, Multinationals at Risk: Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 7 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 43, 73–75
(2011) (comparing terrorism definitions from various nations and illustrating disparities
between each).
58 RILEY & HOFFMAN, supra note 55, at 16 (indicating that survey results revealed the
fact that state and local enforcement officials apply a looser and less precise definition of
what they consider terrorism as compared with the FBI’s explicit definition).
59 Id. at 2 (pointing to terrorism expert Brian Jenkins’s lamentation that terrorism is
merely a “fad” term).
60 Id. at 2–5.
61 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(l) (2014) (offering a terrorism definition in which terrorism is “the
unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a
government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or
social objectives” (emphasis added)); see also COUNTERTERRORISM DIVISION, FBI, TERRORISM
2002–2005, at v (2005) [hereinafter TERRORISM 2002–2005] (mentioning an essential ele-
ment of terrorism definitions as being aims of further political or social objectives); id. at
2–3; Perry, supra note 57, at 76 (highlighting the intent element in the FBI terrorism
definition).
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of some long-range political goal.”62  Acts of terrorism are indistinguishable
from plain crime without an examination of motive.63  Motive is paramount
in determining whether or not a violent or threatening action constitutes
terrorism.  For example, on July 4, 2002, Hesham Mohamed Hadayet opened
fire at the El Al ticket counter at Los Angeles International Airport.64  It was
only after nine months of investigation, in which the FBI determined that
Hadayet had specifically targeted the Israeli airline and had killed two Israeli
civilians in hopes of influencing U.S. government policy in favor of Palestini-
ans, that the act was classified as terrorism.65  In the absence of the political
motive this would have been nothing more than a criminal, albeit tragic,
matter.
While a political or social motivation is a fundamental aspect of terrorist
acts, there exist other important and universal characteristics of terrorist
activities.  Terrorist acts seek “to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm”
which serves as a powerful coercive force compelling the target audience to
take actions or viewpoints they would not otherwise take, or to avoid specific
actions or viewpoints contrary to the beliefs of the terrorist actor.66  In order
to bolster the coercive effect of their actions, terrorist actors generally con-
duct their actions in such a way as to maximize publicity.67  In generating
high degrees of publicity through intentionally provocative actions, terrorists
create lasting psychological repercussions broad enough to intimidate and
coerce not only the direct victims of their threats, but also a greater target
audience.68  By creating deep social anxiety, terrorists elicit enduring fear in
the target population capable of generating long-term coercion and compli-
ance with the values or viewpoints the terrorist acts were intended to
advance.69  On top of the highly public and psychologically powerful charac-
62 RILEY & HOFFMAN, supra note 55, at 3 (emphasis omitted).
63 See TERRORISM 2002–2005, supra note 61, at 32 (stating “[t]errorism is not always
self-evident” and referencing the fact that in the Hadayet shooting case, it was not until
nine months after the shooting that it was determined to have been a terrorist act, thereby
suggesting the necessity of motive in a domestic terrorism classification).
64 See FBI, Justice: El Al Attack Was Terrorism, CNN (Apr. 12, 2003, 12:25 PM), http://
www.cnn.com/2003/US/West/04/12/airport.shooting/.
65 Id.; see also TERRORISM 2002–2005, supra note 61, at 32; John C. Richter, Counter-
terrorism: A Federal Prosecutor’s View, 33 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 297, 326 n.100 (2008).
66 RILEY & HOFFMAN, supra note 55, at 3.
67 See id.; see also Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of the U.K., Speech to the Ameri-
can Bar Association (July 15, 1985) (transcript available at http://www.margaretthatcher
.org/document/106096) (explaining the importance of “starv[ing] [terrorism] of the oxy-
gen of publicity” in order to effectively combat its prevalence).
68 See RILEY & HOFFMAN, supra note 55, at 3; see also TERRORISM 2002–2005, supra note
61, at 33 (explaining that the classification of acts as terrorism generally depends, to some
extent, on an examination of the publicity associated with the attacks and whether they
were intended to increase notoriety and impact a wide audience).
69 See Arik Burakovsky, Understanding the Determinants of Terrorist Attack Publicity
(Apr. 1, 2013) (unpublished manuscript, University of California, San Diego), available at
https://polisci.ucsd.edu/_files/undergrad/Thesis%202013%20Understanding%20the%
20Determinants%20of%20Terrorist%20Attack%20Publicity.pdf.
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ter of terrorist acts, an additional factor routinely considered by the FBI in
terrorism classifications is whether or not there was a conspiratorial dimen-
sion.70  Generally, where such conspiratorial nature was not found, the ter-
rorism characterization has been found to be less applicable.71  However, the
requirement of a conspiratorial dimension is not expressly included in the
FBI’s terrorism definition,72 thereby leaving the question of whether or not it
is an essential element in terrorism determinations open to debate and per-
mitting that it be discounted for purposes of this Note.  Ultimately, the com-
bination of the aforementioned universal factors, consistent across all acts of
terrorism, forwards the ends of provocation of governmental overreaction,
discouragement of dissent, or intimidation and coercion.73
Aware of both the need for clarity in the definition of terrorism and the
presence of underlying factors consistent across all acts of terrorism, the FBI
attempted to codify those themes into a singular, coherent definition, which
was developed as a reflection of legislation as well as consultations with
senior-level government advisory bodies.74  According to the Code of Federal
Regulations, “[t]errorism includes the unlawful use of force and violence
against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, a civilian
population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social
objectives.”75
B. The Domestic Terrorism Threat in the United States
Domestic terrorism is a substantial threat in the United States and
should not be discounted as minimal.76  Despite the fact that in the post–9/
11 era the overwhelming majority of public focus remains on international
70 See RILEY & HOFFMAN, supra note 55, at 4 (examining the importance of a conspira-
torial dimension by providing the example of the murder of Dr. Gunn, a Florida physician
who performed abortions).  Despite the fact that the murder was carried out for purposes
of furthering a social objective, that being bringing an end to abortions, the FBI refused to
characterize the act as terrorism due to the lack of a greater conspiracy. Id.
71 Id.
72 See supra note 61 and accompanying text (providing the FBI’s definition of terror-
ism, which lacks a conspiratorial element).
73 RILEY & HOFFMAN, supra note 55, at 3 (“The fear created by terrorists, for example,
may be intended to cause people to exaggerate the strength of the terrorists and the
importance of their cause, to provoke governmental overreaction, to discourage dissent, or
simply to intimidate and thereby enforce compliance with their demands.”).
74 See id. (indicating input for the terrorism definition from “senior-level advisory and
consulting bodies such as the Vice President’s Task Force on Terrorism”).
75 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(l) (2014).
76 See Domestic Terrorism in the Post-9/11 Era, FBI (Sept. 7, 2009), http://www.fbi.gov/
news/stories/2009/september/domterror_090709 (describing the current state of domes-
tic terrorism as “alive and well”); see also JEROME P. BJELOPERA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R42536, THE DOMESTIC TERRORIST THREAT 1 (2013) (emphasizing that domestic terrorism
has posed a significant threat over the past thirty years and continues to threaten the
United States today); RILEY & HOFFMAN, supra note 55, at 13–17 (discussing various con-
temporary domestic terrorism threats in the United States).
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terrorism threats from prominent terrorist organizations,77 domestic terror-
ism remains a great concern for our country and should be taken at least as
seriously as international threats.78  From its inception in 1908, the FBI has
been tasked with the responsibility of investigating and combating domestic
terrorist threats,79 a role it retains today.80  Immediately upon its inception,
the FBI inherited domestic terrorism threats largely concerning “subversive
domestic political threats, including anarchism and communism.”81  Today,
the FBI continues to face those same historic threats along with new, ever-
changing breeds of terrorism concerns.  However, what has remained consis-
tent is the fact that, despite a rise in a broad array of threats on the interna-
tional level, domestic terrorism remains a threat requiring vigilant
attention.82  In fact, from 2002 to 2005, “[23] of the 24 recorded terrorist
incidents in the United States were perpetrated by domestic terrorists,”83
which offers plain evidence that domestic terrorism continues to account for
the vast majority of terrorist threats faced by this country.
77 See Dale L. Watson, Exec. Assistant Dir., FBI Counterterrorism & Counterintel-
ligence Div., Testimony Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (Feb. 6, 2002)
[hereinafter Watson Testimony], available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/the-ter-
rorist-threat-confronting-the-united-states (discussing the serious threat that “international
terrorists continue to pose to nations around the world, particularly the United States”); see
also James J. Ward, The Root of All Evil: Expanding Criminal Liability for Providing Material
Support to Terror, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 471, 499–500 (2008) (recognizing that the govern-
ment has an “international focus” and views the primary terror threat as being interna-
tional); Domestic Terrorism, supra note 76 (“[G]lobally-fueled terrorism continues to occupy
much of [American authorities’] time and attention these days.”).
78 See Watson Testimony, supra note 77 (presenting statistics showing that between
1980 and 2000 domestic terrorists accounted for 247 of the 335 incidents or suspected
incidents of terrorism in the United States); see also BJELOPERA, supra note 76, at 1 (“The
FBI reported in 1999 that ‘[d]uring the past 30 years, the vast majority—but not all—of the
deadly terrorist attacks occurring in the United States have been perpetrated by domestic
terrorists.’” (alteration in original)); WILLIAM DYSON, INST. FOR INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RESEARCH, THE EMERGENCE OF SPECIAL-INTEREST/SINGLE-ISSUE TERRORISM 6 (2001) (indicat-
ing that law enforcement should recognize that domestic terrorism is a real threat, and
suggesting the threat still remains as law enforcement has not yet adequately developed an
effective program to address the threat); Ward, supra note 77, at 474 (asserting that domes-
tic terrorism acts should not be taken lightly, as they “indeed can ‘happen here’—and
[they have]”).
79 See TERRORISM 2002–2005, supra note 61, at 34.
80 See 28 C.F.R § 0.85(l) (granting the FBI “Lead Agency responsibility in investigating
all crimes . . . which involve terrorist activities or acts in preparation of terrorist activities
within the statutory jurisdiction of the United States”); RILEY & HOFFMAN, supra note 55, at
16 (“[T]he FBI has been designated as the lead federal agency with authority to investigate
acts of terrorism in the United States.”); see also BJELOPERA, supra note 76, at 3 (noting that
the FBI has principal responsibility for investigating terrorism at the “federal level”).
81 TERRORISM 2002–2005, supra note 61, at 34.
82 See Watson Testimony, supra note 77 (recognizing the persistent terrorist threat
posed by traditional sources including right-wing hate groups and left-wing extremists); see
also RILEY & HOFFMAN, supra note 55, at 13–17 (discussing the historic and continuing
domestic terrorism threat posed by several notable ideologies).
83 TERRORISM 2002–2005, supra note 61, at 1.
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Although the threat posed by domestic terrorism is nothing new, the
post–9/11 era has witnessed a shift in the nature of the domestic terrorism
threat.  Historically, the greatest domestic threats came from formal terrorist
organizations with readily identifiable political and social objectives.84  How-
ever, the modern era has brought with it an “insidious concern that touches
all forms of domestic extremism,” that being the lone offender who acts inde-
pendent of any organizational affiliation.85  In addition to the rise of the lone
offender, actors in domestic terrorism have turned their focus to unconven-
tional weapons and nontraditional terror tactics such as nonviolent threats
and intimidation.86  Compounding the problems presented by a rise in lone
offenders and unconventional terrorism tactics is the fact that the global
technological landscape has undergone drastic changes in recent history.
While the presence of extremist ideals has remained largely consistent
throughout history, the rise of the Internet and unprecedented connected-
ness through social media outlets have played a significant role in the devel-
opment of new brands of terrorism, and have opened alternate avenues for
terrorist activity.87  Due to this changing nature of terrorism and an aware-
ness of its domestic pervasiveness, government authorities recognized law
enforcement officials’ need for greater authority and flexibility to meet the
84 See Watson Testimony, supra note 77 (tracing the development of historic sources of
domestic terrorism); see also BJELOPERA, supra note 76, at 10–49 (same); TERRORISM
2002–2005, supra note 61, at 34–35 (same).
85 Domestic Terrorism, supra note 76; see also Joshua K. Marquis & Danielle M. Weiss, Eco-
Terror: Special Interest Terrorism, PROSECUTOR, Jan.–Feb. 2005, at 30 (explaining that lone-
offender actors raise particular concern in that they can easily “blend into their commu-
nity, camouflaging themselves as mainstream concerned citizens”).
86 Michael A. Clancy, Deputy Assistant Dir., FBI Counterterrorism Div., Statement
Before the Senate Judiciary Committee (Sept. 19, 2012) [hereinafter Clancy Statement],
available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/the-domestic-terrorism-threat (highlight-
ing some nontraditional forms of domestic terrorism tactics including “white-collar crime,
threats, and other violations of federal law”); see BJELOPERA, supra note 76, at 1 (acknowl-
edging that “a large number of those labeled as domestic terrorists do not necessarily use
traditional terrorist tactics such as bombings or airplane hijackings”); Susan W. Brenner &
Marc D. Goodman, In Defense of Cyberterrorism: An Argument for Anticipating Cyber-Attacks,
2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1, 51 (2002) (acknowledging development in terror tactics
by domestic terrorists, as they have already moved into using computer technology to carry
out acts of terror and intimidation).
87 See BJELOPERA, supra note 76, at 2 (describing modern domestic terrorists as
“[i]nternet savvy and [willing to] use the medium as a resource for their operations”);
GOV’T PRINTING OFFICE, THE INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM THREAT IS CHANGING 5–6 (2000),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/GPO-COUNTERINGTERRORISM/GPO-
COUNTERINGTERRORISM-1-3.pdf (describing the increase in use of information tech-
nologies by terrorists and the potentially crippling impact such attacks may have on the
United States); Paul N. Stockton & Michele Golabek-Goldman, Prosecuting Cyberterrorists:
Applying Traditional Jurisdictional Frameworks to a Modern Threat, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV.
211, 212–13 (2014) (expressing concern over the threat posed by the use of cyberattacks
by terrorists).
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constantly shifting challenges posed by domestic terrorism.88  The horrific
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 offered the catalyst for such necessary
legislative change to come in the form of the PATRIOT Act.89
C. Section 802 and Its Definition of Domestic Terrorism
Following the devastation of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Congress turned
its attention to drafting legislation that granted law enforcement the author-
ity necessary to meet the threat of terrorism in the modern era.90  Fueled by
a surge in patriotic sentiments and a realization of the extreme threat terror-
ism posed, Congress enacted the PATRIOT Act by “overwhelming, bipartisan
margins.”91  The purpose of the PATRIOT Act was to provide law enforce-
ment agencies with the requisite legal tools and authority to detect and pre-
vent terrorism in any form.92  In drafting the PATRIOT Act, “Congress
simply took existing legal principles and retrofitted them to preserve the lives
and liberty of the American people from the challenges posed by a global
terrorist network.”93  In addition to retrofitting such existent legal principles,
many of them were also expanded so as to increase their applicability.
Included in the Act was section 802, which expanded the definition of terror-
ism to expressly classify “domestic terrorism” as separate from a broader con-
ception of terrorism, including international terrorist activities.94
88 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-52,
115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code) (noting that the
purpose of the legislation was specifically drafted to address the needs of law enforcement
officials in combating mounting terrorist threats by creating various tools with which offi-
cials are able to more effectively investigate, address, and prevent terrorist activity in the
United States); Drew Fennell, The USA PATRIOT Act: Can We Be Both Safe and Free?, DEL.
LAW., Summer 2003, at 10 (describing the PATRIOT Act legislation as “sweeping and com-
prehensive” in its changes in authority granted to law enforcement).
89 USA PATRIOT Act, 115 Stat. 272.
90 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE USA PATRIOT ACT: PRESERVING LIFE AND LIBERTY 1 [herein-
after PRESERVING LIFE AND LIBERTY].
91 Id. (“The USA PATRIOT Act was passed nearly unanimously by the Senate 98–1,
and 357–66 in the House, with the support of members from across the political
spectrum.”).
92 Id.
93 Id. (characterizing the changes in law created by the PATRIOT Act as “modest
[and] incremental”); see Fennell, supra note 88, at 10 (“Section 802 does not create a new
crime of domestic terrorism.  Instead, it expands the type of conduct that the government
may investigate as ‘terrorism.’”).
94 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) (2012) (codifying section 802 of the PATRIOT Act); see also
How the USA PATRIOT Act Redefines “Domestic Terrorism”, ACLU (Dec. 6, 2002), https://www
.aclu.org/national-security/how-usa-patriot-act-redefines-domestic-terrorism [hereinafter
ACLU PATRIOT Act Discussion] (noting that “Section 802 . . . expanded the definition of
terrorism . . . .”).
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A distinct definition of domestic terrorism was necessary to meet the
unique challenge of domestic threats, which is constantly evolving.95  The
PATRIOT Act recognized the potential for domestic actions, typically
addressed as merely criminal, to carry deeper implications and require
stricter punishment when such actions are paired with political or social
motivations.96  With respect to domestic terrorism, the primary concern was
offering a structured definition capable of addressing uses of force or the
threat of force, motivated by political or social radicalization.97  The FBI
sought stronger authority to conduct terrorist investigations when the expres-
sion of otherwise constitutionally protected ideals was taken too far, resulting
in intimidation, coercion, and the threat of violence.98  In order to accom-
plish that goal, the PATRIOT Act clarified the concept of domestic terrorism
and offered a formal, yet broad, definition for the phenomenon the FBI had
long referred to as “Americans attacking Americans based on U.S.-based
extremist ideologies.”99
As mentioned above, section 802 of the PATRIOT Act created a specific
definition of domestic terrorism.  This section of the PATRIOT Act did not
create a new crime called “domestic terrorism,” but rather expanded the type
of criminal behavior that may be deserving of such a characterization and
therefore subject to investigation as domestic terrorist acts.100  Section 802
expressly codifies the fundamental requirement of a political or social motive
in domestic terrorist acts as it does not restrict the classes or types of criminal
actions that may be branded as domestic terrorism.101  Rather, the sole
95 Fennell, supra note 88, at 10 (explaining that provisions of the PATRIOT Act were
intended to account for changes in the threat landscape, changes that would not have
otherwise been addressed by outdated and irrelevant statutory provisions existing prior to
the PATRIOT Act).
96 See ACLU PATRIOT Act Discussion, supra note 94 (emphasizing that section 802
does not create a new crime of domestic terrorism, but rather provides a framework in
which to identify those otherwise criminal acts that rise to the level of terrorism due to
their ideological backing and coercive intentions).
97 See BJELOPERA, supra note 76, at 5–10.
98 Watson Testimony, supra note 77 (describing the role of the FBI in domestic terror-
ism investigations by stating that domestic terrorists “engage in activity that is protected by
constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly” and noting that “[l]aw enforcement
becomes involved when the volatile talk of these groups transgresses into unlawful
action.”).
99 Domestic Terrorism, supra note 76.
100 ACLU PATRIOT Act Discussion, supra note 94 (“Section 802 does not create a new
crime of domestic terrorism.  However, it does expand the type of conduct that the govern-
ment can investigate when it is investigating ‘terrorism.’”); see also Fennell, supra note 88,
at 10 (noting that the Act expanded the concept of terrorism to “include” domestic
terrorism).
101 ACLU PATRIOT Act Discussion, supra note 94 (indicating that section 802 does not
create a new crime for domestic terrorism); see also United States v. Gillespie, 452 F.3d
1183 (10th Cir. 2006) (indicating through sentencing in the case that activity that would
otherwise be considered merely criminal may be terrorist activity when paired with a partic-
ular political or social motivation).
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requirement is that there is a “violation of the criminal laws of the United
States”102 paired with a political or social motivation.
The domestic terrorism definition established in Section 802, and found
at 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) is as follows:
(5) the term “domestic terrorism” means activities that —
A. involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the crimi-
nal laws of the United States or of any State;
B. appear to be intended —
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or
coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction,
assassination, or kidnapping; and
C. occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States.103
Certainly, the above definition creates a concrete standard against which
potential acts of domestic terrorism may be compared in order to determine
whether those acts qualify as such.  However, the definition retains the requi-
site flexibility to address the continually shifting threat posed by domestic
terrorism.  A notable aspect of this expansive definition is the lack of a
requirement of actual violence, injury, or death in terrorist actions.104
Instead, the sole requirement that the activity “involve acts dangerous to
human life”105 gives the domestic terrorism definition a degree of malleabil-
ity, ensuring its applicability to the vast array of developing trends in terrorist
threats such as nonviolent terrorist actions.106  Further, the definition offers
discretion in determining the social or political objective providing the
underlying motivation for the attack by requiring only that the actions
“appear to be intended” to coerce or intimidate.107  While the requirement
that there be the appearance of an intention to coerce or intimidate clearly
underscores the definition’s recognition of motive in the classification of ter-
rorist actions, the requirement appears to diminish, if not eliminate, a mens
rea requirement.  This omission grants authorities a great deal of discretion
102 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5)(A) (2012).
103 Id. § 2331(5).
104 See NANCY CHANG, SILENCING POLITICAL DISSENT: HOW POST-SEPTEMBER 11 ANTI-TER-
RORISM MEASURES THREATEN OUR CIVIL LIBERTIES 44–45 (2002) (suggesting that under the
expanded definition of domestic terrorism in section 802, even nonviolent confrontational
protests could be construed as constituting acts of domestic terrorism).
105 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5)(A).
106 BJELOPERA, supra note 76, at 42 (“While some domestic terrorism suspects engage in
violent plotting, others commit much different crimes that do not physically harm peo-
ple. . . . ‘[P]aper terrorism’ is a term used to describe some of the non-violent criminal
activity committed by sovereign citizens involving the filing of fraudulent documents in the
hopes of harassing enemies or bilking state or federal tax authorities.”); see also Clancy
Statement, supra note 86 (providing a list of potential domestic terrorism threats, which
illustrates the range of actions from violent to nonviolent).
107 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5)(B).
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in determining whether or not there was a sufficient terrorist motive.  Finally,
the definition lacks any requirement of organizational affiliation for classifi-
cation as a domestic terrorist act,108 which is an increasingly important omis-
sion as the nature of terrorism, both domestically and internationally, has
shifted towards cases of “lone-offender” action.109
Undoubtedly, section 802 is significant as a major development in the
struggle against the threat posed by domestic terrorism as it not only offers
clarity on the question of what constitutes domestic terrorism but also main-
tains adequate flexibility to meet unforeseen threats and challenges that may
arise in the realm of domestic terrorism.  However, as will be discussed in
subsequent sections of this Note, section 802’s broad flexibility presents a
challenge in application as it must be ensured that the domestic terrorism
classification is not overextended.  Domestic terrorist threats are grounded in
ideologies that are constitutionally protected; as such, the domestic terrorism
definition should only be applied in cases where actions based on those ide-
ologies are magnified to the point of exceeding constitutional protection.110
Therefore, the challenge for the FBI in dealing with possible domestic terror-
ism threats is to protect the public safety from those threats while “act[ing]
within the confines of the rule of law and the safeguards guaranteed by the
Constitution.”111
III. DOMESTIC TERROR THREATS IN U.S. HISTORY
Prior to an analysis as to whether or not swatting in the political arena is
consistent with conceptions of domestic terror under U.S. law, it is beneficial
to examine past examples of confirmed domestic terrorism in the United
States to serve as points of comparison in the following analysis of political
swatting as domestic terrorism.  Additionally, an examination of the history
of domestic terrorism in the United States reveals the broadening scope of
those ideologies that serve as sufficient bases for domestic terrorism classifica-
108 Id. § 2331(5); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DOMESTIC TERRORISM (2014), available at http:/
/www.justice.gov/usao/priority-areas/national-security/domestic-terrorism (expressing a
willingness to classify “lone wolf” actors as domestic terrorists regardless of organizational
affiliation).
109 See Beau D. Barnes, Confronting the One-Man Wolfpack: Adapting Law Enforcement and
Prosecution Responses to the Threat of Lone Wolf Terrorism, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1613, 1615 (2012)
(acknowledging the increasing emergence of lone-offender terrorism); see also NAT’L CON-
SORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM & RESPONSES TO TERRORISM, UNDERSTANDING LONE-
ACTOR TERRORISM 2 (2013) (referencing a quote by President Obama explaining the perva-
sive threat posed by lone-offender terrorists without organizational affiliation).
110 Watson Testimony, supra note 77 (explaining that law enforcement will only enter
the picture when the extreme ideologies espoused by individuals or groups of individuals
progress into unlawful action); see also BJELOPERA, supra note 76, at 2 (explaining that
domestic terrorists are “distinct” from persons who merely theorize or hold ideologies that
may serve as foundations for domestic terrorism activities); Marquis & Weiss, supra note 85,
at 35 (stating that there is a line, that once crossed, requires action by the justice system as
the act has then moved into the realm of potential terrorism).
111 Clancy Statement, supra note 86.
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tions and in so doing supports the argument in favor of characterizing politi-
cal swatting as an act of domestic terrorism.
As stated previously, the phenomenon of “Americans attacking Ameri-
cans based on U.S.-based extremist ideologies” remains a present reality.112
“Today’s domestic terror[ism] threats run the gamut,”113 but a comprehen-
sive view of domestic terrorism threats beginning in the early 1900s reveals
that those threats have generally fallen into three subgroups, with each hav-
ing distinct eras of prominence.114  Those three subgroups are right-wing
extremism, left-wing extremism, and special interest extremism.115  The fol-
lowing sections will provide a brief history of the ideologies of these groups
and their presence in American history.  Special interest terrorism will be
given special attention because “eco-terrorism” and antiabortion terrorism
are illustrative of the fact that a domestic terrorism classification exists even
where the objective is the furtherance of a particular viewpoint rather than a
complete overhaul of the current government structure.116  Many sources of
historic domestic terrorism threats were geared towards a complete destruc-
tion of the political system then in place, and the development of domestic
terrorism without that focus is an important development.  Increasingly,
domestic terrorism is rooted in ideologies related to a particular viewpoint or
stance on a singular political issue rather than discontent with the American
political system as a whole.117  It is these forms of special interest terrorism to
which political swatting is most analogous and a comparison most helpful.
A. Right-wing and Left-wing Terrorism: Pre-special-interest Dominance
From its inception in the early 1900s, the primary domestic issues facing
the FBI came from left-wing and right-wing extremism.118  An early source of
those threats was the notorious Ku Klux Klan (perhaps better known as the
KKK), which perpetrated acts of hate and intimidation fueled by ideals of
racial supremacy, antigovernment sentiments, and antiregulatory beliefs all
112 Domestic Terrorism, supra note 76.
113 Id.
114 See Watson Testimony, supra note 77 (discussing domestic terrorist threats across
history and their prominence in respective eras); see also Masters, supra note 48 (tracing
the history of various subgroups of domestic terrorism including right-wing groups, left-
wing groups, and lone-offender actors).
115 See Watson Testimony, supra note 77; see also BJELOPERA, supra note 76, at 10–33;
RILEY & HOFFMAN, supra note 55, at 13–17; TERRORISM 2002–2005, supra note 61, at 34;
Masters, supra note 48.
116 Dyson, supra note 78, at 1 (noting that “[m]ore often than not, special-interest/
single-issue extremists do not seek the overthrow of a government or even a major altera-
tion in the manner in which it operates or in the manner in which people live” and that
instead, the goal is to “coerc[e] a government and/or population to modify its behavior
with respect to a specific area of concern”).
117 See Matthew E. Dunham, Eliminating the Domestic Terrorist Threat in the United States: A
Case Study on the Eradication of the Red Brigades, 107 DICK. L. REV. 151, 167 (2002) (discussing
the FBI’s increased awareness of the growth in special interest terrorist activity).
118 TERRORISM 2002–2005, supra note 61, at 34.
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of which they held to be individual freedoms to which they were entitled.119
However, as the political and social threats posed by the KKK grew, the FBI
went after the Klan as terrorists and secured prosecutions of several Klan
members in the 1960s, contributing to a general decline of the
organization.120
From the 1960s through the mid-1980s, the most prominent terrorist
threat came from those ascribing to left-wing extremist ideals.121  These
groups espoused “revolutionary socialist” ideals and “view[ed] themselves as
protectors of the people against the ‘dehumanizing effects’ of capitalism and
imperialism.”122  They did not believe that such ideals could be established
through traditional political avenues, but rather advocated for a revolution-
ary cure.123  Left-wing extremist groups were populated by “a wellspring of
disaffected, radical youth with ideological roots in the civil rights, women’s
liberation, and antiwar movements provided these groups with much of their
militant fervor.”124  In addition to the steady influx of youth into their ranks,
the left-wing ideologists were also sustained due to their ability to draw from
a broad constituency, as they tended to be less radically tied and less violent
when compared with other ideological movements in history.125  However,
despite a less violent approach in furtherance of their left-wing ideals, many
groups espousing those ideals were classified as domestic terrorists.126  In
some states, examples of such left-wing groups included the Black Panther
Party, Students for a Democratic Society, and The Weather Underground.127
However, despite their growing prominence across the late 1960s and 1970s,
many left-wing groups dramatically declined in the mid-1980s as “the fall of
119 See id. (“In the period between World War I and World War II, the domestic threat
primarily came from right-wing groups, like the Ku Klux Klan, which often adhered to
principles of racial supremacy or embraced antigovernment and antiregulatory beliefs in
favor of individual freedoms.”).
120 Id.
121 Watson Testimony, supra note 77; see KARL A. SEGER, LEFT-WING EXTREMISM: THE
CURRENT THREAT 3 (2001) (“[L]eftist extremism in the United States was at its peak during
the 1960s and 1970s . . . [and was] responsible for three fourths of the officially designated
acts of domestic terrorism in the United States during the 1980s.”); Masters, supra note 48.
122 Watson Testimony, supra note 77.
123 Id.
124 Masters, supra note 48; see also SEGER, supra note 121, at 4 (providing a chart indicat-
ing that only eighteen percent of left-wing extremists indicted were over forty as of 2001,
thereby confirming the statement that leftist movements tended to be comprised of
youth).
125 See RILEY & HOFFMAN, supra note 55, at 14 (drawing distinctions between left-wing
groups, right-wing groups, and issue-oriented groups, and highlighting the less violent
nature of the left-wing causes).
126 See id. (noting that left-wing groups can still be terrorists even though they are “gen-
erally less lethal” and rarely engage in action with potential to cause “widespread, indis-
criminate casualties”).
127 See Mark James, The Perfect Storm: Are We Headed for a Resurgence of Right-Wing Domestic
Terrorism?, 2008 J. INST. JUST. & INT’L STUD. 9, 10 (2008) (discussing left-wing extremist
groups that arose in the 1960s); see also Barnes, supra note 109, at 1629.
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communism in Eastern Europe deprived the movement of its ideological
foundation and patronage.”128
The void created by the substantial downturn in the number of left-wing
ideologists was soon filled as right-wing militant groups burst onto the scene
in the late 1980s and grew throughout the 1990s.129  These right-wing groups
expressed ideologies similar to those of the Ku Klux Klan prior to the 1960s,
namely antigovernment sentiment, racism-based hatred, and fundamentalist
Christianity.130  Prominent groups of right-wing extremists in that era
included the National Alliance, the World Church of the Creator (WCOTC),
and the Aryan Nations.131  Over the course of the 1990s, some right-wing
groups even grew so vast as to have substantial national memberships.132
That growth, however, was short-lived as right-wing extremism experienced a
decline toward the late 1990s, and remains only a lingering threat today.133
These residual right-wing groups are substantially more violent than their
left-wing predecessors thereby making them a serious source of concern.134
B. Narrowed Ideologies: The Modern Domestic Threat of Special Interest Terrorism
While remnants of prominent left-wing and right-wing terrorist ideolo-
gies remain, and both continue to present terrorist threats,135 the major
domestic threat emerging in, and dominating, the modern era is that of “spe-
cial-interest terrorism.”136  Special interest terrorism entails violent or threat-
ening actions taken in furtherance of a particular viewpoint or stance on a
specific political or social issue.137  Special interest ideologies are not neces-
sarily antigovernment, but are narrowed to oppose or promote a specific
128 Watson Testimony, supra note 77; see also ALEJANDRO J. BEUTEL, BREACH OF LAW,
BREACH OF SECURITY § 2, para. 4 (2007) (“[Left-wing groups’] downfall had more to do
with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the gains made by the civil right movement than
the FBI’s efforts.”).
129 Masters, supra note 48.
130 RILEY & HOFFMAN, supra note 55, at 14 (“Although related to the Ku Klux Klan and
older American Nazi groups, the new organizations . . . not only champion the old dog-
mas . . . [but] they are also violently opposed to any form of government above the county
level.”); see Watson Testimony, supra note 77 (explaining that right-wing groups continue
to espouse antigovernment and racial supremacy ideals); see also Masters, supra note 48
(detailing right-wing ideologies similar to those held by the Ku Klux Klan of the past,
including fundamentalist Christianity).
131 Watson Testimony, supra note 77.
132 See James, supra note 127, at 12 (stating that national-level, right-wing, extremist
groups appeared in Missouri as early as the 1980s).
133 Watson Testimony, supra note 77 (“Right-wing groups continue to represent a seri-
ous terrorist threat.”); see also SEGER, supra note 121, at 4.
134 RILEY & HOFFMAN, supra note 55, at 14 (“[Right-wing extremist groups] are
extremely violent, have no reservations about killing, spawn successor generations, and are
often oriented toward specific political issues.”).
135 See SEGER, supra note 121, at 4.
136 See Dunham, supra note 117, at 167; Dyson, supra note 78, at 1.
137 Watson Testimony, supra note 77; see also BJELOPERA, supra note 76, 10–34 (discuss-
ing the ideologies of various special interest terrorists).
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viewpoint or practice.138  “[S]pecial interest terrorism differs from traditional
right-wing and left-wing terrorism in that extremist special interest groups
seek to resolve specific issues, rather than effect widespread political
change.”139  Those engaged in special interest terrorism advocate constitu-
tionally protected ideals; however, they often distance themselves from indi-
viduals promoting similar ideals through proper channels, opting instead to
forward their political or social beliefs through radical measures such as vio-
lence, coercion, and intimidation.140  Such perpetrators carry out their
intimidation by “attack[ing] targets that embody [the] distinct political
issues” they wish to either promote or oppose.141
A particularly alarming development arising out of the growth of special
interest terrorism is the lone offender.142  The Department of Homeland
Security has found that, since 1995, the number of terrorist attacks perpe-
trated by individuals without organizational affiliation has grown five-fold.143
This rise in lone-offender attacks is at least partially attributable to the dawn
of special interest terrorism.144  As acts of terrorism, including violence and
intimidation, have increasingly been employed in furtherance of stances on
specific political issues, the role of formalized organizations as the primary
terrorist actors has diminished.145  This shift was likely a major driving force
in influencing Congress to enact the expansive definition of domestic terror-
138 See, e.g., Clancy Statement, supra note 86 (highlighting a potential threat from envi-
ronmental extremists “if they perceive that legislative efforts to protect and preserve the
environment are ineffective or unsuccessful,” illustrating their concern only with a particu-
lar political course of action).
139 Watson Testimony, supra note 77.
140 See BJELOPERA, supra note 76, at 2 (highlighting the fact that domestic terrorists
“often rope themselves off from ideological (above-ground) elements that openly and
often legally espouse similar beliefs”); Dyson, supra note 78, at 1 (“[R]ather than attempt-
ing to ‘educate’ the public about the topic, the clandestine terrorist’s emphasis is more
towards coercing and forcing the people to take a desired action.”); Tricia Engelhardt,
Foiling the Man in the Ski Mask Holding a Bunny Rabbit: Putting a Stop to Radical Animal Activ-
ism with Animal and Ecological Terrorism Bills, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 1041, 1042–43 (2007)
(tracing the progression of animal rights activist groups from mere radicals to terrorists as
their behavior turned violent).
141 Masters, supra note 48.
142 Domestic Terrorism, supra note 76; see NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF TERROR-
ISM & RESPONSES TO TERRORISM, supra note 109, at 2 (quoting President Obama as saying,
“‘One of the dangers we now face are self-radicalized individuals who are already here in
the U.S. and, in some cases, might not be part of any network’” (citation omitted)).
143 Masters, supra note 48.
144 See Dyson, supra note 78, at 8 (arguing that evolutions in terrorism have diminished
the need for group affiliation in order to carry out effective terrorist activities).
145 See Watson Testimony, supra note 77 (identifying a major source of concern for the
law enforcement community as being “an apparent shift in [terrorist operations] from
traditional sources of terrorism—state sponsors and formalized terrorist organizations”);
see also NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM & RESPONSES TO TERRORISM, supra
note 109, at 2 (discussing the weakening of Al-Qaeda and the concurrent rise in lone-
offender style terrorist attacks).
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ism discussed in Part II, which reaches actions carried out by individuals with-
out organizational affiliation.146
As stated previously, two highly notable special interest ideologies that
have motivated substantial acts of terrorism include eco-terrorism and
antiabortion activism.147  Eco-terrorism is a term describing criminal acts
done in the name of protection of the environment.148  The actions of eco-
terrorists seek to coerce enactment of specific policies or actions related to
environmental protection through acts of violence and intimidation.149  Eco-
terrorism rose to prominence in the 1990s, gaining substantial notoriety in
the wake of several high-profile acts of terrorism carried out in the name of
the cause.150  As environmental extremism grew and acts of eco-terrorism
continued, the FBI declared eco-terrorists as the top domestic terrorism
threat in 2004.151  Eco-terrorists’ crimes have attempted to coerce agreement
with their beliefs largely through civilian intimidation including “intimida-
tion of scientists and employees” engaged in work eco-extremists view as con-
trary to their political and social stances on how the environment should be
managed and preserved.152  These actions undertaken by eco-terrorists “have
caused millions of dollars in property damage, and . . . have involved the
intimidation and harassment of victims” including civilians and government
entities alike.153
Similar to eco-terrorism, antiabortion terrorism came into major exis-
tence in the early 1990s when the antiabortion movement experienced the
146 See supra Section II.C; see also Barnes, supra note 109, at 1615 (explaining that law
enforcement tools historically used to meet international terrorist threats are ineffective in
meeting the challenge of domestic lone-offender terrorism and therefore new legislation
was required).
147 Dyson, supra note 78, at 2; Engelhardt, supra note 140, at 1041.
148 Marquis & Weiss, supra note 85, at 30 (defining eco-terrorism as “the use or
threatened use of violence against innocent victims or property for environmental-political
reasons often aimed at an audience beyond the target”).
149 BJELOPERA, supra note 76, at 11 (discussing actions taken by eco-terrorists in pursuit
of their beliefs on environmental policy); Engelhardt, supra note 140, at 1050 (detailing
tactics used by the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) and Animal Liberation Front (ALF) for
purposes of advancing their political beliefs).
150 See, e.g., Natalie Pawelski, Group Claiming Credit for Vail Fires Says the Aim Was to Help
Lynx, CNN (Oct. 22, 1998, 7:14 PM), http://edition.cnn.com/TECH/science/9810/22/
vail.fire.02/ (recounting ELF’s setting fire to seven buildings at the Vail Ski Resort as a
means of advocating for protection of the lynx); see also BJELOPERA, supra note 76, at 11–12
(discussing the history and development of eco-terrorism).
151 Masters, supra note 48; see also Engelhardt, supra note 140, at 1041 (identifying the
classification of eco-terrorism as the primary threat in 2005 as well).
152 BJELOPERA, supra note 76, at 11–13 (discussing philosophies of environmental
extremist groups and the tactics they employ in furtherance of those philosophies).
153 Id. at 11; see Clancy Statement, supra note 86 (expressing concern over potential
destruction of property by environmental extremists if government policies are perceived
as contrary to their beliefs on environmental preservation); see also Dunham, supra note
117, at 167–69 (detailing various instances of arson and bombings carried out by ELF and
ALF against private and governmental entities); Engelhardt, supra note 140, at 1045–46
(claiming that the ELF alone has accounted for $43 million in damage from 1996–2002).
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first cases of killings in the name of the cause.154  However, despite the fact
that antiabortion extremists undertook tactics of extreme violence and
destruction to bring about an end to abortion,155 the actions were not ini-
tially recognized as terrorist acts.156  In fact, while discussing domestic terror-
ism in 1984, William Webster, then-Director of the FBI, cited antiabortion
violence as an example of an action not constituting domestic terrorism
when he stated that bombing “a bank or a post office is terrorism . . .
[b]ombing an abortion clinic is not an act of terrorism.”157  It was not until a
major anthrax-related incident following shortly after the 9/11 attacks that
the FBI acknowledged antiabortion sentiments as a political ideology capable
of supporting domestic terrorism classifications for antiabortion actions.158
That “major anthrax-related incident” occurred in September and October
2001 when Clayton Lee Waagner mailed over 500 letters to abortion clinics
nationwide in which he informed the workers “that they were now exposed to
anthrax and would die.”159  The letters proved to be a hoax and none of the
recipients were in fact exposed to anthrax, but on the heels of 9/11 and
recently confirmed anthrax attacks, the letters generated a great deal of fear
and anxiety.160  Therefore, relying on the recent expansion of domestic ter-
rorism in the PATRIOT Act and heightened fears following 9/11, Attorney
General John Ashcroft acknowledged antiabortion attacks as domestic terror-
ism,161 confirming the fact that the understanding of domestic terrorism was
substantially broadened in the post–9/11 era.
C. Striking a Balance Between Protection of the Public and Preservation of Rights
With the proliferation of special interest terrorism, the nature of domes-
tic terror threats has changed considerably.  In the post–9/11 era, law
enforcement agencies tasked with combating terrorism have expressly recog-
154 See Carol Mason, Who’s Afraid of Virginia Dare? Confronting Anti-abortion Terrorism After
9/11, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 796, 796 (2004) (“[S]o-called pro-lifers began, paradoxically
enough, to kill for life in the early 1990s.”).
155 See MIREILLE JACOBSON & HEATHER ROYER, AFTERSHOCKS: THE IMPACT OF CLINIC VIO-
LENCE ON ABORTION SERVICES 2 (2009), available at http://www.ccpr.ucla.edu/events/ccpr-
seminars-previous-years/Royer-Aftershocks%20The%20Impact%20of%20Clinic%20Vio
lence%20on%20Abortion%20Services.pdf (“Between 1973 and 2003, there were over 300
clinic attacks in the U.S.”); Masters, supra note 48 (“Anti-abortion extremists are responsi-
ble for seven murders, forty-one bombings, and 173 acts of arson in the [United States]
and Canada . . . .”).
156 Mason, supra note 154, at 796–97 (describing the rise of antiabortion violence in
the 1990s, and the federal government’s failure to classify the actions as terrorist acts prior
to the 9/11 attacks).
157 Id. at 813–14 (internal quotation marks omitted).
158 Id. at 797; see COUNTERTERRORISM DIVISION, FBI, TERRORISM 2000–2001, at 24 (2001)
[hereinafter TERRORISM 2000–2001].
159 Mason, supra note 154, at 804, 805; see also TERRORISM 2000–2001, supra note 158, at
24.
160 Mason, supra note 154, at 804.
161 Id. at 804–05; see CAROL MASON, KILLING FOR LIFE 50–51 (2002).
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nized that terrorism threats are not limited solely to actions in furtherance of
those ideologies traditionally branded as extremist or fundamentalist such as
right-wing or left-wing extremism.162  Rather, the changing threat landscape
has created an environment in which domestic terrorism potentially exists
wherever violence, intimidation, or coercion is undertaken with intentions of
furthering or suppressing any political or social viewpoint.163
Politically or socially motivated instances of violence and intimidation
are extremely detrimental to society and represent serious security threats.164
Therefore, such actions and tactics merit increased punishment measures to
guarantee adequate justice and sufficient deterrence.165  Characterizing
those incidents as acts of domestic terrorism permits stiffer sentencing guide-
lines and grants the justice system the necessary authority to effectively meet
those threats.166  However, that extension of authority brings with it a great
degree of responsibility.  Authorities must fiercely guard the balance between
the need to keep the American public safe and the need to protect the con-
stitutional rights of free expression and free assembly.167  “Hate and anger
are not crimes; neither are hard-line and poisonous ideologies.  It’s only
when actions by groups or individuals cross the line into threats, the actual
use of force or violence, or other law-breaking activities that [law enforce-
ment authorities] can investigate.”168  Government authorities must be cau-
tious in their terrorism characterizations so as to avoid stifling legal activism
and nonviolent protest, both of which are important aspects of the American
experience.169  “In the end . . . the [government] will be judged not only by
[its] ability to keep Americans safe from terrorism, but [sic] also by whether
162 See Watson Testimony, supra note 77 (“The third category of domestic terrorism,
special interest terrorism differs from traditional right-wing and left-wing terrorism in that
extremist special interest groups seek to resolve specific issues, rather than effect wide-
spread political change.”).
163 This is evident in the fact that, in the general understanding of terrorism, the
requirement of a political or social agenda is not qualified to require a particular political
or social ideology.
164 See, e.g., BJELOPERA, supra note 76, at 12–13 (discussing special interest eco-terrorism
and the damages it has created on society); see also JACOBSON & ROYER, supra note 155
(examining the impacts of antiabortion violence including in excess of $35 million in dam-
age to clinics and access limitation to women).
165 Marquis & Weiss, supra note 85, at 35 (expressing the fact that prosecutors must
send a clear message to eco-terrorists when they cross the line between constitutionally
protected expression and terrorist coercion).
166 United States v. Arnaout, 431 F.3d 994, 1002 (7th Cir. 2005) (explaining that the
domestic terrorism sentencing enhancement permits application of stiffer sentencing
guidelines for the crime underlying the domestic terrorism claim); United States v. Gra-
ham, 275 F.3d 490, 516–18 (6th Cir. 2001) (describing the domestic terrorism classifica-
tion as an “enhancement” in the sentencing scheme).
167 Clancy Statement, supra note 86.
168 Domestic Terrorism, supra note 76.
169 Johnson, supra note 56, at 256–57.
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[it] safeguard[s] the civil rights and civil liberties for which [it is]
fighting.”170
IV. POLITICAL SWATTING AS DOMESTIC TERRORISM
In light of the discussion of the development of domestic terrorism clas-
sifications in the United States and an examination of trends in domestic
threats in recent history, the question to be answered is whether incidents of
swatting for purposes of intimidating persons, notably professional political
analysts and commentators expressing political views contrary to those held
by the swatter, constitute domestic terrorism under the post–9/11 concep-
tion?  This is an important and difficult question as it straddles the line
between the countervailing interests of applying domestic terrorism classifica-
tions broadly, as intended by the PATRIOT Act, and ensuring no interfer-
ence with the constitutional right to protest contrary viewpoints.
A determination of whether or not an instance of swatting is deserving of
a domestic terrorism designation requires an analysis drawing upon two key
sources.  First, determining whether swatting may rise to the level of domestic
terrorism requires an examination of how swatting fits within the definitional
requirements laid out in section 802 of the PATRIOT Act as well as funda-
mental characteristics of terrorism in general.171  Next, even if a criminal
action is consistent with section 802, the policy implications must be consid-
ered to determine whether or not it is prudent to apply a domestic terrorism
classification, and the stricter sentencing guidelines that come with it, as a
means of recourse for swatting.
A. Domestic Terrorism: A Six-part Test
The process of determining whether or not a criminal action taken
against a civilian target population constitutes domestic terrorism distills to a
six-part test.  The test examines whether the action at issue possesses the fun-
damental characteristics consistent across all actions considered terrorism
and meets the specific definitional requirements of domestic terrorism in
section 802.  The result is a six-part, elemental analysis providing a frame-
work within which it can be determined whether or not a given criminal
action is properly classified as domestic terrorism and deserving of treatment
in line with that characterization.
For an action against a civilian population to constitute domestic terror-
ism, the six-part test requires that the action: (1) seek to advance a political
or social agenda, (2) “involve acts dangerous to human life,”172 (3) be in
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any state,173 (4)
170 Clancy Statement, supra note 86.
171 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) (2012) (codifying the domestic terrorism definition found in
section 802 of the PATRIOT Act).
172 Id. § 2331(5)(A).
173 Id.
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“appear to be intended”174 to intimidate or coerce,175 (5) a civilian popula-
tion,176 and (6) the actions occurred in the territorial United States.177
B. Is Political Swatting Domestic Terrorism?
Therefore, in order to make a determination as to whether or not politi-
cal swatting, as exemplified in the previously mentioned accounts of Erik
Erickson and Patrick Frey,178 would properly be characterized as domestic
terrorism, the practice of political swatting must be analyzed under the six-
part test articulated above.  The test, as stated, requires that each element be
satisfied with no single element being dispositive of domestic terrorism.  In
cases where the requirement in one of the elements is not met, the test will
fail and a classification as domestic terrorism would be undeserved.
1. Political and Social Agenda
The first, and arguably most fundamental, element of the six-part
domestic terrorism analysis concerns whether or not the allegedly terrorist
action was perpetuated in furtherance of a social or political ideal.  This
requirement is derived from an elemental understanding of terrorism as a
whole, including both international and domestic threats.179  Although the
general notion of terrorism is understood and the term carries a practically
universal pejorative connotation, there remains a high degree of variance
across levels of government in determinations as to which actions or tactics
constitute terrorism.180  However, there are select aspects consistent across
all incidents of terrorism that serve as fundamental elements in any terrorist
act or tactic.181  The most notable and universal element is the requirement
that the act promotes or suppresses a political or social ideal.182
174 Id. § 2331(5)(B).
175 Id. § 2331(5)(B)(i).
176 Id.
177 Id. § 2331(5)(C).
178 Supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text.
179 See RILEY & HOFFMAN, supra note 55, at 2–3 (stating that “[i]t is this political element
that distinguishes economically motivated crimes from politically motivated (i.e., terrorist)
violence,” thereby indicating that terrorist violence requires an underlying political
agenda); see also BJELOPERA, supra note 76, at 3 (discussing the fact that acts of domestic
terrorism are those motivated by an underlying political and social agenda).
180 Domestic Terrorism, supra note 76 (“Today’s domestic terror threats run the
gamut . . . .”); see also RILEY & HOFFMAN, supra note 55 (highlighting the fact that terrorism,
while unsettled in definition, is generally taken as a pejorative term).
181 TERRORISM 2002–2005, supra note 61, at iv–v (acknowledging that there is no single,
widely accepted definition of terrorism, but that there is agreement on the general concept
of terrorism which centers on fundamental elements of those actions deemed terrorist).
182 See Keiran Hardy & George Williams, What is “Terrorism”?: Assessing Domestic Legal
Definitions, 16 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 77, 92–95 (2011) (offering two definitions
of terrorism, both of which make reference to there being a foundational social or political
view behind terrorist actions); see also RILEY & HOFFMAN, supra note 55, at 2–3.
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In the post–9/11 era, the understanding of what constitutes a political
or social ideology capable of validating a terrorism designation has been dras-
tically loosened.  No longer is there an assumption that all terrorist acts are
rooted in an ideology shared collectively with a greater organization.  In fact,
organizational affiliation is not a requisite, nor a highly dispositive, factor in
terrorism classifications.183  Examples of this shift in understanding are man-
ifest in antiabortion terrorism and eco-terrorism.  In both instances, the polit-
ical ideology underlying the terrorist actions, and sustaining their
characterization as terrorist acts, is highly specific and often only individually
held.  In fact, the political agenda requirement no longer refers solely to
terrorist ideologies of old, which sought abolition and overhaul of the politi-
cal system in its entirety.184  Instead, modern examples of domestic terrorism
highlight the reality that what constitutes a political ideology for purposes of
terrorism classifications can be specific viewpoints on singular political issues
free from greater ideological affiliation.185
In the cases of political swatting, the presence of a political objective is
obvious.  It is this underlying political motive that differentiates such cases of
swatting in the realm of political discourse from those aimed at celebrities or
online gamers.  Here, the political underpinnings of the swatting acts perpe-
trated against Frey and Erickson were prompted by their political expression
of their conservative viewpoints.186  The ideal backing the swatting actions
were not merely to victimize Erickson and Frey specifically, but to intimidate
holders of conservative viewpoints, and in so doing advance the contrary
beliefs held by the swatters.  While all cases of swatting are undoubtedly crim-
inal actions, the additional layer of a political motivation elevates acts of polit-
ical swatting beyond the foundational hurdle that acts of domestic terrorism
must clear, that being the requirement of an underlying political or social
ideology.  However, as stated before, the mere presence of intent to further a
political agenda is alone insufficient to validate a domestic terrorism designa-
tion, and further analysis is required.
183 See 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) (2012) (statute codifying the domestic terrorism definition
established at section 802 of the PATRIOT Act and lacking any requirement of organiza-
tional affiliation for an act to constitute domestic terrorism).
184 See Watson Testimony, supra note 77 (discussing right-wing and left-wing domestic
terrorism and the shared goal of abolition of the current political system to be restructured
in line with their ideals); see also TERRORISM 2002–2005, supra note 61, at 54 (representing
the historic dominance of right-wing and left-wing terrorism in stating: “During the first 75
years of its history the FBI encountered a predominantly domestic terrorist threat . . .
primarily from right-wing extremists, [which] then shifted to left-wing, socialist-oriented
groups”).
185 See Dyson, supra note 78, at 1.
186 See, e.g., Collins, supra note 13 (explaining that the Frey swatting came on the heels
of his reporting against Anthony Weiner and his recent sex scandal, implying that the
swatting attack was in response to his discussion of Weiner).
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2. Acts Dangerous to Human Life
In order for an otherwise criminal action to constitute domestic terror-
ism under the general definition established in section 802 of the PATRIOT
Act, and codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5), the action must cause “danger[ ] to
human life.”187  It is important to note that danger to human life is an essen-
tial element because it sets apart those ordinary criminal offenses from eligi-
bility for the heightened sentencing available for actions amounting to
domestic terrorism.  In so doing, the requirement of danger to human life
serves to protect the integrity of the domestic terrorism designation by way of
reserving such a characterization to only the most serious crimes.  However,
while domestic terrorism actions must pose danger to human life, the act
itself need not be one with a violent nature.188  The FBI has acknowledged
the fact that domestic terrorism is not solely perpetuated by way of violent
actions.189  Rather, in the modern era, there have been instances in which
completely nonviolent crimes have been considered domestic terrorism.190
In cases where nonviolent actions are determined to be domestic terrorism,
there must nonetheless be a danger presented to human life, however that
danger or threat may merely be a consequence of the otherwise nonviolent
terrorist act rather than a direct threat.  For example, in our modern world,
it is not unimaginable that actions compromising vital divisions of our
nation’s infrastructure, although not directly threatening to human life, may
create circumstances in which there is real danger to citizens’ safety and well
being.  This recognition is important, as the lack of a violent crime require-
ment dramatically increases the scope of those actions that are considered
dangerous to human life and eligible for a domestic terrorism designation.
While certainly this requirement serves to limit those actions that may be
subject to a domestic terrorism classification, the restrictiveness of the limita-
tion has been greatly diminished in the post–9/11 era191 and the boundary is
blurred.  However, this Note need not explore the question of where that
boundary exists because, as detailed below, the danger to human life posed
by political swatting is rather evident.
187 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5)(A).
188 See CHANG, supra note 104, at 44–45 (suggesting that the broadened definition of
domestic terrorism in the PATRIOT Act is such that even nonviolent, and yet confronta-
tional, protestors may be subject to investigation as domestic terrorists).
189 BJELOPERA, supra note 76, at 1–2 (stating that not all terrorist actions need to be
inherently violent or intend physical harm to victims, and discussing some nontraditional
and nonviolent terrorist acts, some of which have grown as domestic terrorists become
more internet savvy).
190 See, e.g., Brenner & Goodman, supra note 86 (stating that nonviolent cyberterrorism
is the wave of the future and discussing the damaging impacts of such cyberterrorism).
191 Theresa M.B. Van Vliet, Anti-Terror Law Will Impact Telecom and Internet Providers,
COUNSEL’S ADVISORY (Washington Legal Foundation), Jan. 2, 2002 (characterizing the
PATRIOT Act as making sweeping changes to the law with the intention of drastically
expanding the authority of law enforcement in approaching actions related to terrorism).
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In the case of political swatting, there is substantial danger to human life
as such actions create dangerous circumstances.  The crimes of fraud at the
core of swatting are not themselves violent or directly threatening to human
life, but nonetheless create the requisite “danger to human life” necessary to
satisfy the domestic terrorism test requirement.  As stated above, under the
expanded concept of acts of domestic terrorism in the post–9/11 era, actions
subject to a terrorism designation need not directly harm or threaten harm
to victims.192  Rather, where actions create dangerous circumstances, or an
environment in which a threat to human life is evident and danger immi-
nent, those actions satisfy the “danger to human life” requirement for a
domestic terrorism characterization.
Therefore, although the crimes of fraud arising in incidents of swatting
are not themselves violent, when they catapult an unsuspecting political com-
mentator into a situation in which he or she is staring down the barrel of a
rifle at a SWAT team member, armed and ready to shoot, there is clear dan-
ger to human life.  SWAT teams are deployed not only with the authoriza-
tion, but often with the expectation of the need for lethal force in their
response.193  So, when a SWAT team enters a residence or business, there is a
substantial risk of a mistaken use of force by either the victim in shock and
defense, or the SWAT team operating on false information of an ongoing
threat.194  Further, as stated above, police responses in incidents of political
swatting not only potentially threaten the lives of the unsuspecting victims,
but equally endanger the lives of responding officers and innocent members
of the community, further validating the argument that acts of political swat-
ting do in fact pose very real danger to human life.195  Regardless of the fact
that, to date, injuries resultant from swatting have been limited in number
and severity, “[i]t’s only a matter of time before someone gets seriously
injured,”196 and the practice of addressing instances of political swatting as
acts of domestic terror need not wait until such serious injury occurs as the
danger is presently evident.  For this reason, political swatting meets the sec-
ond prong of the six-part domestic terrorism test requiring that the allegedly
terrorist actions create danger to human life.
192 See Dyson, supra note 78, at 6 (expressing the fact that many domestic terrorism acts
result solely in property damage rather than harm to persons, therein implying that not all
domestic terrorism acts must result in harm to individuals in order to meet the threshold
for such legal classification).
193 See Singh, supra note 28, at 680–81 (explaining SWAT teams’ role as responders in
highly tense crisis situations requiring heavy weaponry and advanced training).
194 Don’t Make the Call, supra note 7 (“[O]fficers are placed in danger as unsuspecting
residents may try to defend themselves.”).
195 Id. (“The community is placed in danger as responders rush to the scene, taking
them away from real emergencies.”); see also The Crime of ‘Swatting’, supra note 5 (discussing
incidents that have harmed both officers, as well as civilians who have “suffered mild heart
attacks” as a result of the shock experienced when the SWAT teams enter their homes).
196 The Crime of ‘Swatting’, supra note 5 (quoting Kevin Kolbye, the assistant special
agent in charge of the FBI’s Dallas division) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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3. In Violation of the Criminal Laws of the United States or of Any State
Under the PATRIOT Act, Congress did not create an independent
crime of “domestic terrorism.”  Instead, the domestic terrorism classification
was merely intended to build upon the existent criminal laws and provide
prosecutors a tool to more harshly pursue punishment of criminal acts that
were ideologically motivated and otherwise terrorist in nature.197  Further,
the domestic terrorism classification was purposed to permit additional pun-
ishment, where necessary, for a criminal act carried out in the United States
where the context in which that crime occurred demanded greater
recourse.198  As such, in order for there to be a valid claim that an action
constitutes domestic terrorism under the statutory definition laid out in sec-
tion 802 of the PATRIOT Act, and codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5), the action
must be one that is in “violation of the criminal laws of the United States or
of any State.”199  The action must itself be independently in violation of the
criminal laws of the United States because a prosecution will be brought not
on charges of domestic terrorism, but rather on charges corresponding to
the particular criminal law which the act violates.200  The statute does not
require that the underlying crime be of a particular class of crimes, but only
that the action alone would merit criminal charges.201  The nature of the act
as violative of federal or state criminal laws serves as an essential prerequisite,
without which the context and intent of the actions would be irrelevant as
there could be no prosecution—and domestic terrorism characterization—
for an action that is not in violation of criminal law.
Political swatting satisfies the requirements of this particular element of
the domestic terrorism test in that such actions are in violation of the crimi-
nal laws of the United States.  This fact is supported by evidence of past con-
victions of swatters on grounds that they acted in violation of federal
conspiracy laws, including both conspiracy against individuals202 and conspir-
197 PRESERVING LIFE AND LIBERTY, supra note 90, at 1 (“Congress simply took existing
legal principles and retrofitted them to preserve the lives and liberty of the American peo-
ple from the challenges posed by [terrorism].”).
198 ACLU PATRIOT Act Discussion, supra note 94 (discussing the fact that the
PATRIOT Act expanded the definition of domestic terrorism, but did not expand the con-
duct that may be investigated as domestic terrorism because it did not create new criminal
acts).
199 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5)(A) (2012).
200 RILEY & HOFFMAN, supra note 55, at 4 (explaining that terrorists are convicted of
“the accompanying crimes, such as murder, weapons violations, and so forth, that consti-
tute their terrorist acts”).
201 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5)(A) (indicating that Congress did not contemplate any particu-
lar type of crime necessary to carry a domestic terrorism characterization because the code
section lacks any clarification or qualification of the requirement that the act be in viola-
tion of the criminal laws of the United States or corresponding state); see United States v.
Arnaout, 431 F.3d 994, 1000–01 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Graham, 275 F.3d 490,
517–18 (6th Cir. 2001).
202 18 U.S.C. § 241.
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acy to defraud the government.203  These past successful convictions of indi-
viduals engaged in swatting conspiracies, including the cases of Matthew
Weigman and Carlton Nalley referenced previously,204 confirm that swatting
is seen as a serious violation of criminal conspiracy laws meriting lengthy con-
victions.  Further, there has been some recent passage of swatting-specific leg-
islation in various states classifying the action as criminal and in violation of
the criminal laws of the states that have passed such legislation.205  Similar
action has been contemplated at the federal level as there has been a recent
push for investigating swatting as a specific federal criminal action.206
Although such legislation has yet to be introduced or passed at the federal
level, merely an expression by some of the desire to investigate illustrates a
general negative sentiment towards swatting and suggests that prosecutions
of swatting incidents are favored regardless of the theory of criminal liability
argued.
4. “Appear to be Intended” to Coerce or Intimidate
The threat and fear associated with terrorism is largely due to the fact
that it is highly coercive and capable of impacting the lives of its targets not
only in the present, but also well into the future.  Therefore, when courts
make determinations as to whether or not a given act is one of terrorism, a
major consideration is the extent to which there was the intention of coerc-
ing or intimidating the victims and greater target population, therein creat-
ing the lingering psychological repercussions characteristic of terrorist
acts.207
However, in recognition of the difficulty in proving the subjective state
of mind of the alleged terrorist actor, and consistent with the post–9/11
broadened view of terrorism, the modern domestic terrorism definition soft-
ened the mens rea standard by requiring only a showing that the alleged
terrorist actions “appear to be intended” to coerce or intimidate.208  Facially
this may appear to be far too permissive; however, because presumably there
was at least some mens rea requirement for proving the underlying criminal
action and there are five other factors that must be proven in order for there
to be a domestic terrorism designation, the low bar set by this requirement is
not unduly expansive.  The appearance of an intention to coerce or intimi-
date in cases of domestic terrorism is best determined in looking at the
203 18 U.S.C. § 371.
204 Supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text.
205 See, e.g., Brumfield, supra note 6, at 588–89 (discussing the introduction of chapter
284 in California as a means of creating greater punishment for swatting cases, including a
requirement to serve at least 120 days in county jail).
206 See Chambliss Letter, supra note 52 (letter from U.S. Senator Saxby Chambliss call-
ing for investigation and action to address the rising swatting threat experienced in states
nationwide).
207 RILEY & HOFFMAN, supra note 55, at 3 (emphasizing the importance of psychological
repercussions as an element of terrorism determinations).
208 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5)(B).
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nature of actions.  Actions fueled by and designed in furtherance of motives
to instill fear, maximize publicity, and create deep-seated psychological
repercussions are generally viewed as being those supporting the appearance
of an intention to coerce or intimidate.209  Examples of this are present in
looking at the actions of antiabortion domestic terrorists and eco-terrorists.
In both eco-extremism and antiabortion radicalism, the actions taken against
civilian individuals, such as scientists or doctors in positions of prominence in
their fields, were perceived as intending to intimidate and coerce a broader
audience holding beliefs for which those individuals were symbolic.210  The
choice of the victims reflected a desire to maximize publicity, and send a
message far broader than a threat to the individual victims.  Their status as
symbols of the beliefs opposed by the terrorists made them ideal targets for
an attack on the philosophy they represented.  Similarly, the horrific nature
of the terrorist activities undertaken, ranging from severe property damage
to murder,211 was intended to instill in those with analogous ideals a fear for
their lives.
Under that relaxed standard, a determination that political swatting of
notable figures heavily involved in advocacy of a particular political viewpoint
appears intended to intimidate or coerce the civilian population into sharing
their political orientation is a defensible interpretation.  Further, the nature
of swatting is such that it elicits a high degree of fear and social anxiety capa-
ble of breeding lasting psychological repercussions.212  As noted previously,
one of the means by which terrorist actions create environments of fear and
alarm is by carrying out their threats or attacks with an eye towards maximiz-
ing publicity.  In both of the instances referenced earlier in this Note,213 the
swatting incidents targeted public figures that stand as symbols of their
respective political beliefs.214  In so doing, the immediate threat conveyed to
the swatting victims is equally conveyed to their audiences and others who
share their political orientations.  In addition to the publicity generated
around the attacks, further social anxiety spawns from the violative nature of
the attacks as they occur in the victims’ homes.  In the United States, the
sanctity of the home has long been regarded as deserving of “overriding
209 See RILEY & HOFFMAN, supra note 55, at 2–4.
210 See BJELOPERA, supra note 76, at 12–13 (explaining attacks on scientists and doctors
as tactics to attack a particular viewpoint).
211 Id. at 11–12.
212 See, e.g., Ellis & Fuchs, supra note 9 (citing a teenaged gamer who was a swatting
victim, and his fear in the wake of the attack, as he stated “I was like, Oh my God, I’m going
to die” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Saenz, supra note 13 (quoting Patrick Frey as
saying, “It’s a phone call that could have gotten me killed,” indicating a strong sense of fear
on the part of Frey in the wake of the swatting attack (internal quotation marks omitted)).
213 Supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text.
214 Erik Erickson is the editor-in-chief of RedState.com, a conservative website, and a
conservative CNN political contributor. See Collins, supra note 13.  Patrick Frey is a deputy
district attorney, and well-known conservative blogger under the name of Patterico. See
Sexton, supra note 13.
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respect.”215  Therefore, when an attack on an individual and their political
views breaches the sanctity of one of the most private and protected areas in
American society, there naturally is a high degree of uneasiness and concern.
However, perhaps the most powerful source of fear created by incidents
of political swatting, and the aspect of such attacks with the greatest contribu-
tion to lasting psychological repercussions, is the fact that the danger is cre-
ated by manipulation of civilians’ most accessible means of security.  In
communities across the country, there is a sense of security in knowing that
law enforcement is readily available in the form of local police.  In fact, in
everyday life, local police offer the sole form of readily accessible security
available to the average American.  Therefore, when swatting attacks manipu-
late the primary source of security into being a source of threat and danger
to the victims they are sworn to protect, fear and terror are natural.216
Exploitation of police response as a means of creating a threat elicits a feel-
ing of helplessness in victims and others sharing the political or social stance
for which the victims were targeted.
Clearly, in light of the foregoing reasons, swatting in the political arena
can be understood as being perpetrated with the intention of intimidating
individuals of counter viewpoints into silence, and such actions create deep-
seated fear in communities of individuals sharing the targeted beliefs.  There-
fore, such actions possess the fundamental elements of general terrorism def-
initions and meet one of the key statutory requirements with respect to the
“domestic terrorism” definition outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5).217
5. A Civilian Population
In order for an action taken to stifle a societally held ideology or view-
point, the acts of coercion and intimidation must target a “civilian popula-
tion,” which necessarily implies an impact on a party larger than a single
individual.  A dictionary definition of a population is a body of individuals
“having a quality or characteristic in common.”218  With the rise of special
interest terrorism, and the increased acceptance of specific ideals as ground-
ing for terrorism claims, there has been a natural expansion of what is con-
sidered a population for purposes of the statutory definition.  As the issues
underlying terrorism have grown in specificity, the “populations” subjected
to coercion and intimidation due to their views on those issues are smaller in
215 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980) (stating that in the United States,
there is an “overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our
traditions since the origins of the Republic”).
216 The unanimity of the attacker and the exploitation of the security arm of the gov-
ernment to carry out the attack are particularly alarming and strike deeper fear into the
target population.  Brenner and Goodman elaborated upon this concept of the unanimity
of the attacker as a “terror multiplier” in their discussion of cyberterrorism. Brenner &
Goodman, supra note 86, at 28.
217 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) (2012).
218 Population, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
population (last visited Apr. 4, 2015).
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size.  The fact that domestic terrorism designations are permitted to stand
when acts are taken against these smaller groups indicates that “a popula-
tion,” for purposes of the domestic terrorism definition, is not necessarily a
substantial fragment of society.  In modern domestic terrorism cases, the
nature of the underlying issue determines what constitutes a population.219
Additionally, in cases where the underlying political agenda or ideology is
one in which there are two prominently held views around which society
bifurcates, courts have found that those ascribing to a viewpoint on each side
of the issue constitute a population.220  An example of this is the case of
antiabortion terrorism, in which the issue consists of two dominant views:
pro-life and pro-choice.  For purposes of terrorism designations, the courts
have found that those individuals ascribing to a viewpoint on one side of the
issue are properly considered a population.221  The case of political swatting
presents a parallel situation in which there are two dominant viewpoints held
on the issue and therefore a similar treatment of the collective group ascrib-
ing to each viewpoint as constituting a population is proper.
In the case of political swatting, there are potentially two populations
that are subjected to coercion or intimidation at the hands of the swatters.
First, the ardent followers of the particular political figures targeted may con-
stitute a population provided there is some collective body of those followers.
However, the stronger argument is that there exists a population in the gen-
eral group of believers who ascribe to the political ideology for which the
targeted political figure serves a representative.  In the case of the political
swatting instances mentioned previously, both commentators represented
the conservative, Republican viewpoint in American politics.  The politically
motivated actions taken against them were intended not only to victimize
them, but also to reach all those of a similar political orientation.  This argu-
ment is particularly analogous to the case of antiabortion terrorism in that
there exist two dominant viewpoints, here conservative rather than liberal,
which is symbolized by the victimized commentators.  Therefore, similar to
antiabortion terrorism, the individuals holding the beliefs that were targeted
by the political swatting attack represent a population capable of satisfying a
domestic terrorism classification.
219 The advent of special interest terrorism has led to terrorist actions based on more
specific issues and viewpoints, and therefore, terrorism designations on the basis of those
narrow viewpoints implies that the number of individuals constituting a population cannot
be a static consideration, but rather will vary on the basis of the particular issue underlying
the viewpoint motivating the attack and the size of the audiences concerned.
220 See, e.g., Mason, supra note 154, at 797 (mentioning that cases of terrorism
grounded in the abortion debate have been found to be acts of terrorism, thereby sug-
gesting that courts are comfortable with the pro-life vs. pro-choice division creating two
populations).
221 See supra note 161 (noting Attorney General John Ashcroft’s acknowledgment of
antiabortion attacks as capable of constituting domestic terrorism, therein implying that
victims of those special interest actions constitute a population sufficient to support a
domestic terrorism classification for acts against them).
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6. Actions Occurred in the Territorial United States
The final requirement for a domestic terrorist classification is that the
acts occur in the territorial United States.222  With respect to the six-part test,
this element is the most obvious, and requires no substantial explanation.
The adjective “domestic” plainly implies that any action meeting such desig-
nation must occur within the United States.223  Therefore, the analysis is sim-
ple, and when applied to political swatting it is plain.  The past instances of
swatting indisputably occurred in the United States and therefore subsection
18 U.S.C. § 2331(5)(C) poses no objection to characterizing those actions as
forms of domestic terrorism.
C. Policy Concerns in Favor of the Application of Domestic Terrorism Sentencing
While the post–9/11 era has expanded those instances in which domes-
tic terrorism exists,224 the breadth and flexibility of the section 802 definition
requires restraint on the part of authorities in applying the definition so as
not to overstep the bounds of constitutional protections when criminal law
would suffice.  Additionally, there must be cautious application of the domes-
tic terrorism classification in order to protect the integrity and significance of
that characterization.  An overly broad application of what constitutes domes-
tic terrorism threatens to water down the force of the designation and in so
doing, diminishes the power or gravity of future characterizations of domes-
tic terrorism.  Therefore, even in instances where the provisions of the
domestic terrorism definition are met, it is essential to view the policy impli-
cations so as to determine whether a domestic terrorism classification is pru-
dent and the heightened punishments deserved.
With regard to political swatting, there are strong public policy concerns
in favor of classifying swatting used as a political weapon as domestic terror-
ism.  The freedom of political discourse is not only a valuable, but also a
vigorously protected aspect of the American way of life.225  One of the most
fundamental of rights, guaranteed to Americans in the First Amendment, is
the right to freedom of expression.226  Such freedom of expression requires
the freedom to engage in political discourse and voice opinions across the
political spectrum.
In addition to the value of protecting expression to preserve the integ-
rity of the Constitution, protection of political expression is socially desirable
222 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5)(C).
223 Domestic, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/domestic
(last visited Apr. 4, 2015).
224 ACLU PATRIOT Act Discussion, supra note 94 (“Section 802 of the USA PATRIOT
Act (Pub. L. No. 107-52) expanded the definition of terrorism to cover ‘domestic,’ as
opposed to international, terrorism.”).
225 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326–27 (1937) (describing the freedom of
thought and speech as “the matrix, the indispensible condition, of nearly every other form
of freedom”).
226 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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as it is necessary for a flourishing democracy.  At its core, democracy is rooted
in the voice of the people.  Freedom of expression is necessary to permit
individuals to express their opinions and ensure their ability to vote for rep-
resentation consistent with their beliefs.  It is through the free exchange of
ideals that social development occurs and advancement is achieved in areas
where change is necessary.  Finally, it is a primary function of the American
government to provide a space in which an individual may engage in self-
realization.  That self-realization cannot be achieved when particular ideals
are barred from discussion or made unattractive due to threat of harm to
holders of that viewpoint.
An additional policy consideration in cases of swatting is that of the
direct burdens placed on local communities and local authorities.  In recent
years with the contraction of the U.S. economy, many communities have
been marred by budget constraints requiring severe cut-backs in their opera-
tions.227  As mentioned earlier in this Note, SWAT responses create a sub-
stantial financial burden, with costs reaching into the thousands of dollars for
every deployment.  Therefore, continued instances of fraudulent 911 reports
aimed at intimidating politically adversarial ideals have the potential to place
already budget-constrained communities in increasingly dire financial straits
and limit the effectiveness of their law enforcement bodies.  Perhaps even
more burdensome is the precarious predicament encountered by local
authorities in communities facing increasing prevalent false reports.  Author-
ities may be more hesitant to respond with full force for fear of an unneces-
sary deployment of resources in response to a false report.  Authorities will be
forced to choose between a full response, therein sacrificing response capa-
bility to simultaneous situations, resulting in the possibility of an inadequate
response to an actual serious and violent incident.  This uncertainty inter-
feres with the ability to conduct effective law enforcement and generates inef-
ficiency in policing efforts.  At an even more fundamental level, such
challenges drastically increase risk to the community and its citizens.  Such
serious societal harms are certainly deserving of heavy punishment for pur-
poses of ensuring justice.  In addition to that retributivist justification, the
harms posed by swatting must be punished to ensure that they are heavily
deterred.  Such justice and deterrence would be achieved by characterizing
political swatting incidents as acts of domestic terrorism deserving of
increased punishment under the stiffer sentencing guidelines permitted for
acts of domestic terror.
CONCLUSION
While certainly not every instance of swatting merits treatment as an act
of domestic terrorism, and the story of the teenaged gamer, Paul Horner,
mentioned at the outset of this Note would be an absurd application of the
domestic terrorism enhancement, all cases illustrate the substantial danger
227 See Nagourney & Lovett, supra note 7 (discussing police department budget cuts
and the financial strain created by swatting attacks).
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created by acts of swatting.  Those dangers, when applied in the political
realm, offer a situation in which acts of swatting should be properly branded
as domestic terrorism meriting the elevated sentencing requirements that
come with that characterization.  Support for such characterization of politi-
cal swatting as domestic terrorism is rooted in the expanded definition of
domestic terrorism developed in the PATRIOT Act.  The fact that political
swatting meets the statutory requirements for domestic terrorism in section
802, weighed against the strong public policy concern of protecting freedom
of political discourse, not only permits, but necessitates the treatments of
such acts of swatting as domestic terrorism to ensure adequate recourse and
effective deterrence of this dangerous, and potentially crippling, political
threat.
